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GERMAN LAW ON PATENT 
INJUNCTIONS: LEGAL FRAMEWORK 
AND RECENT DEVELOPMENTS 
PROF. DR. PETER GEORG PICHT, LL.M. (YALE)*  
INTRODUCTION 
For patent litigation, Germany arguably is, together with the United 
Kingdom, the paramount venue in Europe.1 Stakeholders, such as 
patentees, licensees, inhouse and outside counsel, scholars and non-
German courts or lawmakers, therefore have a strong interest not only in 
the established legal framework for patent litigation in Germany, but also 
in shifts this framework is, of late, undergoing. At the same time, the 
language barrier complicates insights on these matters, not least for Anglo-
American stakeholders, although a slowly increasing part of scholarship, 
and even of case-law, is available in English. Against this background, the 
present contribution sets out to explain basic structures and recent 
developments in German patent injunction law. It covers the main types of 
and requirements for such injunctions under German law (A.), the 
injunction’s scope as claimed and granted (B.), bifurcation and stays (C.), 
defenses and limitations (D.), alternatives to injunctive relief (E.), and 
recent developments (F.), before a conclusion and an outlook (G.) round 
off the paper.   
 
* Chair for Economic Law, Chairman Center for Intellectual Property and Competition Law 
(CIPCO), University of Zurich; Fellow Max Planck Institute for Innovation and Competition, Munich. I 
thank Lord Justice Arnold, Professors Bentley, Chien, Contreras, Dinwoodie, Golden, Husovec, and all 
participants of the Tilburg University’s 2018 Conference on “Mapping Flexibilities for Injunctive 
Relief in Patent Law” for their valuable input on the matter. 
1 Communication from the Commission to the European Parliament and the Council: Enhancing 
the patent system in Europe, at 18, COM (2007) 165 final (Apr. 3, 2007); Christoph Ann, 
Verletzungsgerichtsbarkeit – zentral für jedes Patentsystem und doch häufig unterschätzt, 3/4 GRUR, 
205-209 (2009); Mathieu Klos, Unsere Stars für Europa, Deutschlands Patentexperten wählen ihre 
Favoriten für das europäische Patentgericht, 4 JUVE RECHTSMARKT, 72-83 (2010); Thomas Kühnen & 
Rolf Cleassen, Die Durchsetzung von Patenten in der EU – Standortbestimmung vor Einführung des 
europäischen Patentgerichts, 6 GRUR,  592-597 (2013). 
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A. PATENT INJUNCTIONS: MAIN TYPES AND REQUIREMENTS  
1. Main types 
As a rule of thumb, all acts infringing a patent can trigger injunctive 
relief under German law. This goes, hence, not only for direct 
infringements (Sec. 9 German Patent Act – GPA) but also for contributing 
infringements (Sec. 10 GPA), for acts that enable or promote the 
infringement, and for uses not falling within the literal scope of a patent 
claim but captured by the doctrine of equivalents.2 Requirements for an 
injunction can, however, slightly vary depending on the type of the 
infringing act (cf. below). 
Besides injunctions granted as part of a final court decision (“final 
injunctions”), interim relief is available in the form of “preliminary 
injunctions” (cf. below chapter A.3.). Injunctions can also form part of a 
court settlement, based either on a court-recorded party agreement 
(Sec. 794(1) No. 1 Code of Civil Procedure – CCP, Sec. 779 German Civil 
Code – GCC) or on a court proposal (Sec. 278(6) CCP). 
  
 
2 On the doctrine of equivalents in German patent law, see GORDIAN N. HASSELBLATT, 
Münchener Anwalts Handbuch Gewerblicher Rechtsschutz, §39 ¶ 199 ( C.H. Beck 4th ed. 2012); 
Christian Osterrieth, Patent Enforcement in Germany, in PATENT ENFORCEMENT WORLDWIDE: 
WRITINGS IN HONOUR OF DIETER STAUDER, ¶109 (Oxford: Hart Publishing 2015). 
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2. General requirements  
Summarily speaking, the main requirements for an injunction are:  
Patent related ● Patent/SPC/patent application; 
● patent term not over, Sec. 16 GPA; 
● no lapse of the patent, Sec. 20 GPA; 
● no exhaustion of the patent. 
Procedural ● Capacity to sue (patentee; exclusive 
licensee;security right holder); 
● capacity to be sued (direct and indirect infringer; 
contributor; co-liable party); 
● deficiencies regarding the validity of the patent, 
leading, however, in principle only to a stay, 
Sec. 148 GCC; 
● claims for injunctive relief will be dismissed if the 
infringing act they address was already the subject 
of prior infringement proceedings.3 
Infringing 
Acts 
● Use of the patent by the infringer, Sec. 9, 10, 14 
GPA; 
● risk of first-time (Sec. 139(1)(2) GPA) or recurrent 
(Sec. 139(1)(1) GPA) infringement;4 
 
3 Deutsches Patentgesetz [PatG][German Patent Act] Dec. 16, 1980, BUNDESGESETZBLATT 
[BGBL] at § 145 (Ger.); see Osterrieth, supra note 3, at ¶ 28. 
4 Only infringing acts which have actually taken place, or which are likely to happen, can be 
enjoined, i.e. injunctions are not granted with regard to theoretical settings; on the requirements for a 
sufficient first-time infringement risk, see KLAUS GRABINSKI & CARSTEN ZÜLCH, § 139 PatG, in 
PATENTGESETZ: GEBRAUCHSMUSTERGESETZ, PATENTKOSTENGESETZ  ¶¶28 32 (Georg Benkard ed., 
C.H. Beck 2015); Alfred Keuekenschijver, Unterlassungsanspruch, Schadenersatz, in PATENTGESETZ: 
UNTER BERÜCKSICHTIGUNG DES EUROPÄISCHEN PATENTÜBEREINKOMMENS, DER REGELUNGEN ZUM 
PATENT MIT EINHEITLICHER WIRKUNG UND DES PATENTZUSAMMENARBEITSVERTRAGS MIT 
PATENTKOSTENGESETZ, GEBRAUCHSMUSTERGESETZ UND GESETZ ÜBER DEN SCHUTZ DER 
TOPOGRAPHIEN VON HALBLEITERERZEUGNISSEN, GESETZ ÜBER ARBEITNEHMERERFINDUNGEN UND 
GESETZ ÜBER INTERNATIONALE PATENTÜBEREINKOMMEN ¶263 (Busse Rudolf & Keukenschrijver eds., 
2016) (in particular on negative statements regarding the patent); regarding logistics providers: BGH 
Sept. 19, 2009, Xa ZR 2/08(MP3 Import); OLG Hamburg Oct. 16, 2008, 5 W 53/08 (iPod II). 
Injunction claims are too broad and will remain unsuccessful if they exclusively try to capture future 
infringing acts; Rudolf Kraßer & Christoph Ann, PATENTRECHT: LEHRBUCH ZUM DEUTSCHEN UND 
EUROPÄISCHEN PATENTRECHT UND GEBRAUCHSMUSTERRECHT [Patent Law, Textbook on German and 
European Patent Law and Utility Model Law] § 35 ¶88 ( C.H. Beck 7th ed. 2016); Grabinski & Zülch, 
supra note 5, at ¶ 32. Furthermore, infringing acts do not justify an injunction if there is no risk of a 
recurrent infringement. This risk is, however, presumed in the event of an infringement, the 
presumption is rebuttable but the threshold for a rebuttal is high; see Grabinski & Zülch,, supra note 5, 
at ¶ 30. One option is a cease-and-desist declaration, secured by a contractual penalty; Kraßer & Ann, 
supra note 5, at §35 ¶ 6 Note further that the risk of a recurrent infringement can be removed by a court 
decision granting (preliminary) injunctive relief; OLG Karlsruhe Apr. 10, 1991, 6 U 164/90; OLG 
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● with regard to interim measures, the interests of the 
patentee and the act of infringement must 
outweigh the interests of the potential infringer in 
a balancing of interests.5 
Justifications ● No act of use that is permitted under Sec. 11 GPA 
(non-commercial, experimental, etc.); 
● no priority right, Sec. 12 GPA; 
● no right to continue use of the patent’s subject 
matter after the patent’s re-entering into force, 
Sec. 123(5)-(7) GPA; 
● no governmental order removing patent protection 
due to public welfare or security interests, Sec. 13 
GPA; 
● no contractual (Sec. 15(2) GPA) or compulsory 
(Sec. 24 GPA) license, no (general) declaration of 
willingness to license (Sec. 23 GPA); 
● no usurpation of the invention by the patentee vis-
à-vis the “infringer”, Sec. 8 GPA; 
● no free state of the art-defence (also called 
“Formstein”-defence; cf. BGH, 29.04.1986,  X ZR 
28/85 – Formstein); 
● no double patenting, Art. II § 8 IPT; 
● no fraudulous acquisition of the patent (only in 
exceptional settings). 
Enforceability 
of the Claim 
● Claim not time-barred, Sec. 141 GPA, Sec. 194 et 
seq. GCC; 
● no forfeiture due to lapse of time, Sec. 242 GCC; 
● no abuse (in particular of dominance), Sec. 19, 20 
GCA/Art. 102 TFEU; 
● no previous communications or other acts by the 
patentee that contradict the seeking of an 
injunction and render it a violation of good faith, 
Sec. 242 GCC. 
 
Karlsruhe Feb. 22, 1995, 6 U 250/94; OLG Hamburg June 20, 1984, 3 W 103/84;  KG Berlin Aug. 20, 
1992, 25 U 2754/92; KG Berlin Oct. 25, 1996, 5 U 4912/96; OLG Hamm Feb. 19, 1991, 4 U 231/90. 
5 Kluas Haft et. al., , Unterlassungsgebote in Fällen der Verletzung von Rechten des Geistigen 
Eigentums [Cease and desist orders in cases of infringement of intellectual property rights], 11 GRUR 
INT’L 928 (2011). 
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3. Specific requirements for preliminary injunctions  
The injunction stipulated in Sec. 139(1) GPA is a final, as opposed to 
a preliminary injunction. “Final” is, however, not the same as “infinite” 
since it is, by definition, not possible to enjoin from the use of a patent 
beyond the patent’s protection period.6  The duration of patent protection 
constitutes, hence, a built-in time limitation for injunctions. 
Much more limited in time are the injunctions granted as preliminary 
injunctive relief under Sec. 935, 940 CCP.7 This limitation can be caused 
not only by the fact that the preliminary injunction is replaced by a final 
decision8 but also by a time-limited scope of the preliminary injunction 
itself,9 or by a legal remedy10 curtailing the injunction. 
For a preliminary injunction, the patentee has to show its evident 
claim to an injunction and a reason why the injunction ought to be granted 
as a preliminary relief.11 To fulfil the first requirement, both patent validity 
 
6 Grabinski & Zülch, supra note 5, at ¶ 34, with reference to BGH Nov. 22, 1957, I ZR 152/56 ;  
BGH May 20, 2008, X ZR 180/05 . 
7 Ulrike Voß, Vor §§ PatG § 139–PatG § 142b [Verletzungsprozess], in BECKOK PATENTRECHT 
¶ 276 (Fitzner Uwe, Lutz Raimund & Bodewig Theo eds., C.H. Beck 4th ed. 2019). As to TRIPS- and 
EU law-background, see Agreement on Trade Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights § 50, 
41(1), Apr. 15 1994, 1869 U.N.T.S. 99, 33 I.L.MK. 1197 [hereinafter TRIPS Agreement]; Directive 
2004/48/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 29 April 2004 on the Enforcement of 
Intellectual Property Rights § 9, June 2, 2004; Gesetz zur Verbesserung der Durchsetzung von Rechten 
des geistigen Eigentums [Law on improving the enforcement of intellectual property rights], July 11, 
2008,    Bundesgesetzblatt [BTBL I] at 7, 274. The core, general requirements for preliminary relief 
under Sec. 935, 940 CCP are the existence of a claim (Verfügungsanspruch); here mainly: requirements 
for an injunction, as described in A.2. and of sufficient grounds/urgency for issuing a preliminary 
decision (Verfügungsgrund; here i.a.: occurrence of an infringement alone not sufficient, further aspects 
necessary that intensify need for immediate relief; OLG Düsseldorf May 18, 2009, 2 U 140/08; much 
depends on expeditious conduct of patentee, OLG München Mitt.2001, 85, 89 – Wegfall der 
Dringlichkeit). The patentee does not have to fully prove that these requirements are fulfilled 
(Vollbeweis), it suffices for it to show prima facie-evidence, i.e. preponderance of the evidence 
(überwiegende Wahrscheinlichkeit), ZIVILPROZESSORDNUNG [ZPO] [Code of Civil Procedure] as 
amended Oct. 10, 2013, §§ 920(2), 936, 940.  Furthermore, the court has to balance the involved 
interests (here: of infringer and patentee). For legal remedies against a preliminary injunction, cf. i.a. 
Zivilprozessordnung [CCP] {Code of Civil Procedure] as amended Oct. 10, 2013, §§ 924, 926, 927. On 
the—for the patent context quite important—instrument of a “protective brief” submitted by the 
(alleged) infringer, see Volker Deutsch, Die Schutzschrift in Theorie und Praxis [The Protection Script 
in Theory and Practice], 5 GRUR 327-332 (1990). 
8 On the specific constellation that, after the granting of a preliminary injunction, an injunction is 
denied in the final decision, see BGH Apr. 01, 1993, I ZR 70/91. 
9 Grabinski & Zülch, supra note 5, at ¶¶ 153b, 153h, with case law. One example is preliminary 
injunctions regarding trade fairs, LG Düsseldorf May 11, 2004, 4a O 195/04. 
10 See Zivilprozessordnung [ZPO] [Code of Civil Procedure] as amended Oct. 10, 2013, §§ 927, 
929. 
11 Haft et al., supra note 6, at 927. 
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and infringement need to be obvious.12 Unclear validity of the respective 
patent may prevent the court from issuing a preliminary injunction.13 As a 
general rule, courts do not issue a preliminary injunction where they would 
stay (Sec. 148 CCP) the main proceedings (on stays cf. below chapter C.) 
because of pending validity proceedings and a high likelihood of 
invalidation of the patent.14 The same is usually15 true where a first 
instance-ruling has held the patent to be invalid, even though the decision is 
not yet final.16 Conversely, a first-instance (although not final) 
confirmation of validity corroborates that preliminary relief is justified.17 
The second requirement is fulfilled where preliminary relief appears 
suitable and necessary to protect the applicant from substantial 
disadvantages (Verfügungsgrund – grounds for preliminary relief).18 This 
usually requires that an element of urgency is present and that the interests 
of the patentee outweigh — in a balancing exercise — the interests of the 
infringer.19 All in all, the requirements for a preliminary injunction are 
rather strict since this relief severely impairs the rights of the alleged 
infringer.20 Consequently, preliminary injunctions are a well-established, 
but – at least traditionally21 – not a very frequent feature of German patent 
law.22  
 
12 Voß, supra note 8, at ¶ 281; Osterrieth, supra note 3, at ¶ 79; see OLG Düsseldorf Apr 29, 
2010, I 2 U 126/09. In a way, these requirements, together with the ensuing balancing of interests, 
soften bifurcation and the infringement-injunction nexus as far as preliminary relief is concerned. 
13 Validity concerns are usually considered as removing the grounds/urgency for preliminary 
relief (Verfügungsgrund); OLG Düsseldorf, Apr. 29, 2010, I 2 U 126/09; OLG Karlsruhe, July 8, 2009, 
6 U 61/09. 
14 OLG Düsseldorf Oct. 21, 1982, 2 U 67/82; OLG Düsseldorf Oct. 05, 1995, 2 U 43/95; OLG 
Frankfurt Mar. 27, 2003, 6 U 215/02. 
15 But not where the decision is evidently flawed, see OLG Düsseldorf May 29, 2008, 2 W 47/07. 
16 Grabinski & Zülch, supra note 5, at ¶ 153b. 
17 OLG Düsseldorf Apr. 29, 2010, I 2 U 126/09. 
18 Voß, supra note 8, at ¶ 284. 
19 Id. 
20 Osterrieth, supra note 3, at ¶79. 
21 On recent tendencies to grant preliminary injunctions more frequently, see Roland Böhler, 
Einstweilige Verfügungen in Patentsachen [Interim Injunctions in Patent Matters], 11 GRUR, 965 
(2011). 
22 On numbers, see Andreas von Falck, Einstweilige Verfügungen in Patent- und 
Gebrauchsmustersachen, 10 MITTEILUNGEN DER DEUTSCHER PATENTANWÄLTE 429 (2002). On 
preliminary injunctions in general, see also Böhler, supra note 22, at 965; Tobias Wuttke, Die aktuelle 
gerichtliche Praxis der einstweiligen Unterlassungsverfügung in Patentsachen – zurück zu den 
Anfängen? [The current judicial practice of interim injunctive relief in patent matters - back to the 
beginning?], 9 MITTEILUNGEN DER DEUTSCHEN PATENTANWÄLTE 393 (2011). Prominent court 
decisions have held that it can be difficult to assess the requirements for an injunction in preliminary 
proceedings and that, therefore, this relief is to be granted with caution, see OLG Karlsruhe Apr. 27, 
1988, 6 U 13/88; OLG Karlsruhe July 8, 2009, 6 U 61/09 at ¶ 13; OLG Düsseldorf, May 29, 2008, 2 W 
47/07 (especially on the relevance of first instance-decisions on patent validity); OLG Hamburg Sept. 3, 
1987, 3 U 83/87; OLG Frankfur, May 3, 1988, 6 U 207/87. 
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B. SCOPE AS CLAIMED AND GRANTED 
The usual patent infringement litigation in Germany includes an oral 
hearing and is decided by a judgment on the merits,23 including a decision 
on costs and provisional enforcement.24 The operative part 
(Tenor/Urteilstenor) of such a judgment is based on the plaintiff’s motion, 
reflects its plea in law, 25 and provides the legal basis for the enforcement 
of the ruling.26 An infringement decision must state clearly from which 
actions a defendant has to refrain.27 Wording and interpretation of the 
decision’s operative part (Tenor) are crucial since they determine the 
(range of) acts which a defendant is not allowed to repeat/undertake.28 The 
operative part must not be so abstract as to cover acts which were not in 
dispute.29 By way of interpretation, the scope of an injunction is oftentimes 
delineated according to the so-called „core theory”: The infringer cannot 
evade an injunction by making minor changes to the infringing act/product 
if the core of the (form of the) infringement remains unchanged.30 
Whether and in which cases the patent claims can be used to identify 
the infringing acts is a complex and highly debated issue.31 Although a 
plaintiff is not procedurally barred from asserting broad claims for patent 
infringement, even claims as comprehensive as the patent claims 
themselves,32 the action will be dismissed unless the plaintiff specifies the 
infringement,33 in particular the infringing product etc., in the initial 
complaint or during34 the proceedings. While the Court may not award 
more than the plaintiff has requested (Sec. 308(1) CCP), it is possible to 
reframe the claim, to grant less than requested, or to base the decision on 
 
23 On wording regarding claims and subclaims of the infringed patent, see Voß, supra note 8, at ¶ 
198. 
24 Id.  at ¶ 197. 
25 Id.  at ¶ 36. 
26 BGH Mar. 30, 2005, X ZR 126/01. 
27 Grabinski & Zülch, supra note 5, at ¶ 32. 
28 Johann Pitz, Patentverletzungsverfahren [Patent Infringement Litigation]¶ 134 (C.H. 
Beck.2010). 
29 Grabinski & Zülch, supra note 5, at ¶ 32. 
30  Pitz, supra note 29, at ¶ 134. 
31 See BGH  Apr. 29, 1986, X ZR 28/85; BGH, Mar. 30, 2005, X ZR 126/01; OLG München Oct. 
6, 1958, 6 W 607/58; Peter Meier-Beck, Probleme des Sachantrags im Patentverletzungsprozeß, 3/4  
GRUR [GERMAN ASSOCIATION FOR THE PROTECTION OF INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY] 276, 277 (1998); 
Grabinski & Zülch, supra note 5, at ¶ 32. 
32 Grabinski & Zülch, supra note 5,   at ¶ 32. 
33 BGH Feb. 23, 1962, I ZR 114/60; BGH, Apr. 29, 1986, X ZR 28/85. 
34 BGH Nov. 24., 1999, I ZR 189/97. 
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different legal grounds than submitted.35  Inadmissible actions will be 
thrown out by means of a procedural ruling.36  
C. BIFURCATION AND STAYS  
In Germany, patent litigation is a civil law dispute subject, in 
principle, to the same procedural rules as other civil law cases.37 As a very 
important exception to this rule, however, German patent litigation is 
“bifurcated”: Court proceedings are split into validity matters38 on the one 
hand and all other patent-related disputes, infringement disputes in 
particular, on the other hand.39 As one of the reasons for this approach, the 
relatively thorough patent granting procedure is perceived to justify a 
presumption of validity of the patent, permitting the infringement court to 
grant relief without having itself assessed patent validity. Furthermore, the 
effectiveness of infringement proceedings would be reduced if the 
infringement court had to deal with validity matters.40  
2. Stay of infringement proceedings pending validity proceedings 
Due to bifurcation, it is possible (and frequent) that injunction 
proceedings and validity proceedings run in parallel and that the 
infringement court awards an injunction before the validity court ascertains 
whether the patent in question is valid or not.41 A key instrument for 
avoiding contradictory results in the two prongs of the bifurcated system — 
grant of injunction on the one, invalidation of the patent on the other hand 
— is a stay of the infringement proceedings according to Sec. 148 CCP.  
Courts may grant a stay at first, second,42 or third43 instance. They 
have some discretion based on a balancing of the parties’ interests.44 As a 
 
35 Voß, supra note 8, at ¶ 36. 
36 Pitz, supra note 29, at ¶ 134. 
37 Osterrieth, supra note 2, at ¶ 2.. 
38 The main relevant types of validity proceedings are opposition proceedings (Sec. 59, 81 GPA) 
or an action for revocation (Sec. 22, 81 GPA). The German Patent Office, the Federal Patent Court, and 
the Federal Court of Justice have exclusive jurisdiction over validity, infringement courts are bound by 
their decision. Cf. id.; PETER MES, PATENTGESETZ, GEBRAUCHSMUSTERGESETZ § 139 ¶ 353 ( C.H. 
Beck 3d. ed. 2015). 
39 Osterrieth, supra note 2, at ¶ 1. 
40 On both reasons, see id. at ¶ 3. 
41 Id. at ¶ 4. 
42 Id. at ¶ 5; Kraßer & Ann, supra note 5, § 36 ¶ 71.; On the particularities of a second instance 
assessment, i.a. on the lower threshold for a stay if the patentee won the first instance, can — as a result 
—enforce the injunction based on the provisionally enforceable first instance decision, and is, therefore, 
less severely affected by a stay, cf. OLG Düsseldorf Jun. 20, 2002, 2 U 81/99; OLG Düsseldorf Dec. 
21, 2006, 2 U 58/05. 
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general tendency, German courts use this discretion to take a rather 
patentee-friendly position, they are restrictive in the grant of stays.45 
According to one of the standard tests, an infringer requesting a stay must 
show a high likelihood that the patent will be invalidated.46 A stay is 
considered appropriate if the patent has already been restricted in 
opposition (Sec. 21, 59 GPA) or nullity (Sec. 22, 81 et seq. GPA) 
proceedings at first instance, at least where this restriction has the 
challenged form of execution no longer covered.47 Some scholars argue 
that opposition proceedings suggest a suspension more strongly than 
actions for revocation since, in opposition proceedings, it is the patentee 
who bears the burden of proof.48 Generally speaking, a stay seems more 
likely where novelty of the infringed patent is questionable,49 and less 
likely where opposition/revocation proceedings focus on inventiveness.50 If 
one action for revocation has failed but a second action been filed, 
infringement proceedings will usually not be stayed any more, unless 
imminent success of the second action for revocation is evident.51 The 
suspension shall not be granted if the defendant has initiated the invalidity 
proceedings with delay (Sec. 296 CCP).52 Neither the mere possibility of 
destruction or revocation nor a threat of an action for annulment justify a 
stay.53 The same goes for a compulsory license action since such action can 
legitimate use of the patent for the future only.54  
As to the standards by which the infringement courts determine the 
likelihood of patent invalidation, there is no formal taking of evidence but 
the defendant should not be significantly worse off than if the infringing 
 
43 BGH Sep. 28, 2011, X ZR 68/10; BGH Apr. 06, 2004, X ZR 272/02 (holding that the interests 
of the patentee ought to prevail the more clearly the later the infringer has attacked the patent’s 
validity). 
44  BGH, Sep. 28, 2011, X ZR 68/10; OLG München, Dec. 29, 2008, 6 W 2387/08. 
45 Mes, supra note 39, at  § 139 ¶ 354. 
46 Id. at § 139 ¶ 352, 354; Grabinski & Zülch, supra note 5, at ¶ 107; Christian Osterrieth, Patent-
Trolls in Europa – braucht das Patentrecht neue Grenzen?, 6 GRUR 540, 543 (2009). On the lower 
threshold before appeal courts, see BGH Nov. 11, 1986, X ZR 56/85; Grabinski & Zülch, supra note 5, 
at ¶ 107. 
47 Grabinski & Zülch, supra note 5, at ¶ 107 with reference to OLG Düsseldor, Feb. 22, 2012, I 2 
U 26/05. 
48 Mes, supra note 39, at § 139 ¶ 359. 
49 For instance, because the opposing party raises elements of the state of the art which have not 
been reviewed in the verification procedure; LG München I Aug. 24, 2007, 21 O 22456/06. 
50 Mes, supra note 39, at  § 139 ¶ 355. 
51 BGH Jul. 17, 2012, X ZR 77/11. 
52 LG München I May 19, 2011, 7 O 8923/10; BGH Sep. 28, 2011, X ZR 68/10; GRABINSKI & 
ZÜLCH, 2015, ¶ 107. 
53 Grabinski & Zülch, supra note 5, at ¶ 107. 
54 Id. at ¶¶ 107, 109. 
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court also had the jurisdiction to decide on validity, and the courts do 
engage in a serious examination of the likelihood of success.55 For instance, 
if a stay is requested due to a nullity situation based on manifest prior use, 
the infringer must produce conclusive and detailed evidence of the alleged 
prior use.56 Stays may be decided upon without oral hearing, but this is not 
the rule.57 The decision on a stay can be appealed (Sec. 252, 567 et seq. 
CCP) but review is limited.58 
Especially in recent times, bifurcation has drawn criticism,59 not least 
because a considerable patent invalidation rate and substantial time gaps 
between the decisions in infringement and validity proceedings can harm 
alleged infringers who are enjoined from using a technology the patent on 
which is subsequently declared invalid.60 The need to wait for the decision 
of the – usually slower – validity court delays the overall resolution of the 
case61 and alleged infringers may be forced into settlement by the costs and 
other disadvantages they would incur during this period.62 On the other 
hand, the swifter decision on and termination of an infringement which 
bifurcation permits does generate effective patent protection and it certainly 
makes Germany an attractive venue for patentees.63  
3. Other types of stays and procedural reactions to patent invalidation 
Usually, an injunction issued by a court of first instance is 
provisionally enforceable on condition that the plaintiff lodges sufficient 
security. Enforcement of the injunction can, as an exception, be stayed at 
the request of the defendant64 where (i) the defendant provides security 
(Sec. 719, 707 CCP), (ii) an enforcement threatens to inflict serious, 
 
55 Id. 
56 Critical of the high requirements for suspension and with further references; see id. at ¶ 107. 
57 Id. at ¶ 108. 
58 OLG Düsseldorf, May 27, 2003, 2 W 11/03 – Vorgreiflichkeit; OLG Düsseldorf, Dec. 08, 
1993, 2 W 79/93 – Prüfungskompetenz des Beschwerdegerichts, ¶ 8; OLG München, Dec. 29, 2008, 6 
W 2387/08 – Abstrakte Vorgreiflichkeit. 
59 See  Peter Meier-Beck, Bifurkation und Trennung, Überlegungen zum Übereinkommen über 
ein Einheitliches Patentgericht und zur Zukunft des Trennungsprinzips in Deutschland, 10 GRUR 929, 
936; Sivaramjani Thambisetty, SMEs and Patent Litigation: Policy-Based Evidence Making?, 32(4) 
EUR. INTELL. PROP. REV. 143, 144 (2010); Mark A. Lemley, Why Do Juries Decide If Patents Are 
Valid?, 98 VA. L. REV. 1673, 1732 (2013); see Damages in international arbitration, Practical Law UK 
Practice Note 0-519-4371 (2019). 
60 E.g., BGH, Jul. 08, 2014, X ZR 61/13. 
61 Damages in international arbitration, Practical Law UK Practice Note 0-519-4371 (2019). 
62 Meier-Beck, supra note 60, at 932. 
63 Id. 
64 For granting of an use-by period according to considerations of proportionality, see infra Part 
D.6. 
GERMAN LAW ON PATENT INJUNCTIONS 1/6/2020 2:34 PM 
2019  German Law on Patent Injunctions: Legal Framework and Recent Developments 225 
 
irreparable damage upon the defendant, and (iii) a balancing of interests 
shows that the defendant’s interests outweigh the plaintiff’s interests given 
the facts of the case, including validity concerns.65  
Other reasons for delaying or staying injunctions in time are, in 
particular, so-called “torpedo” actions in other EU Member States under 
Sec. 27, 30 of the ECJ Regulation,66 a pending constitutional complaint 
against a ruling that grants annulment,67 or a referral for a preliminary 
ruling to the Court of Justice of the European Union pursuant to Sec. 267 
TFEU.68 
If the patent lapses during the infringement proceedings, but without 
retroactive effect, the patentee must limit its claims to the period of patent 
validity and otherwise withdraw them lest its action be dismissed in this 
respect.69 If the infringement court issues an injunction and the patent is 
subsequently invalidated, the infringer may file an “action raising an 
objection to the claim being enforced” (Sec. 767 CCP) based on the 
grounds that the patent, the use of which has been enjoined, lacks validity. 
Furthermore, the infringer may file for an interim order staying 
enforcement (Sec. 769 CCP). 70 If the infringement decision is final and has 
already been enforced before the invalidation/lapse of the patent (or in spite 
of the patent having lapsed during the infringement proceedings),71      an 
action for retrial according to Sec. 580 No. 6 CCP (by way of analogy)72 or 
claims based on undue enrichment (Sec. 812 et seq. GCC) may be raised. 
An action for retrial based on a decision (partly) invalidating the patent can, 
however, only be brought after the invalidating decision has become final.73 
 
65 Haft et al., supra note 6. 
66 Cf. Osterrieth, supra note 3,  at ¶ 34; THOMAS KÜHNEN, HANDBUCH DER PATENTVERLETZUNG,  
§ C ¶ 177 (Carl Heymanns Verlag 12 ed. 2017). 
67 Cf. LG Düsseldorf Aug. 27, 2004 (suspending on constitutional complaint). 
68 Mes, supra note 39, at  § 139¶ 352. This can apply not only where the referral resulted from 
proceedings concerning the patent whose (alleged) infringement caused the infringement proceedings 
to-be-stayed, but also where the referral concerns another patent but raises the same issue which is 
relevant to the infringement proceedings to-be-stayed; BGH Jan. 24, 2012, VIII ZR 236/10. 
69 Thomas Kühnen, Das Erlöschen des Patentschutzes während des Verletzungsprozesses, 
Materiell-rechtliche und verfahrensrechtliche Folgen, 3/4 GRUR 288, 289-93 (2009). 
70 Osterrieth, supra note 3, ¶16.      
71 BGH July 7, 2010, Xa ZR 118/09.      
72 BGH Apr. 17, 2012, X ZR 55/09; BGH  July 29,  2010, Xa ZR 118/09. 
73 OLG Düsseldorf Nov. 11, 2010, I-2 U 152/09, https://openjur.de/u/537812.html.      
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D. DEFENSES AND LIMITATIONS 
1. Considerations of public interest  
i. Relevance and types of public interest considerations 
Sec. 139(1) GPA itself, German patent law’s core provision on 
injunctions, does not leave room for the consideration of public interest 
beyond what is already embodied in the requirements the provision 
establishes for the grant of an injunction. Nor does a strong tradition of 
wide judicial discretion exist,74 which would enable courts to broadly 
introduce public interest considerations.  
The balancing of interests required for an interim injunction, however, 
and — in particular — the provisions in Sec. 24(1) No. 2 GPA,75 Sec. 11 
GPA, and Sec. 13(1) GPA are important settings in which public interest 
considerations can be brought to bear. The general concept of public 
interest, which is embodied in these provisions, changes over time and 
cannot be cloaked into a single, general formula.76 It is a broad and multi-
facetted concept, encompassing, for instance, technical, economic, socio-
political, and medical aspects,77 which factor into an assessment of whether 
an injunction would be proportional under the circumstances of the case.78 
To give an idea, aspects hitherto considered relevant were: 
● the patent holder did not satisfy or could not satisfy domestic 
needs;79 
● improvement of the trade balance; 80 promotion of exports;81 
● improvement of the currency situation;82 
● likely insolvency of the licensee and resulting increase in 
unemployment;83 
 
74 Ansgar Ohly, Patentrolle” oder: Der patentrechtliche Unterlassungsanspruch unter 
Verhältnismäßigkeitsvorbehalt? - Aktuelle Entwicklungen im US-Patentrecht und ihre Bedeutung für 
das deutsche und europäische Patentsystem, GRUR INT’L 787, 795 (2008).      
75 On the compatibility of this provision with TRIPS Agreement, supra note 8, at § 30      ;      cf. 
Rüdiger Wilhelmi, PATG § 24 [Zwangslizenz; Patentrücknahme], in BECKOK PATENTRECHT  ¶24 
(Fitzner Uwe et. al.eds., C.H. Beck 12th ed. 2019).      
76 BGH Dec. 5, 1995, X ZR 26/92.      
77 Rüdiger Rogge & Helga Kober-Dehm, PATENTGESETZ: GEBRAUCHSMUSTERGESETZ, 
PATENTKOSTENGESETZ ¶17 (C.H. Beck, 11th ed. 2015)     ; BGH Dec. 5, 1995        X ZR 26/92 ; BGH 
July 13, 2004, KZR 40/02.      
78 BGH Dec. 5, 1995, X ZR 26/92. 
79 RG May 27, 1918, I. 89/17; RG, Jan. 18, 1936, I 90/35.      
80 RG June 27, 1928, I 271/27.      
81 RG Dec. 21, 1935, I 18/35.      
82 RG Feb. 1, 1938, I 173 174/36.      
83 RG Mar. 11, 1926, I 243 244/25; RG Jan. 24, 1934, I 37/33.      
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● increase in workplace safety;84 
● promotion of public health;85 
● continuous availability of a particular medicinal product,86 in 
particular one that has major advantages (therapeutic properties, 
efficacy, reduced side effects) over similar products;87 
● the simultaneous pursuit of financial interests does not prevent 
presence of a public interest and the granting of a compulsory 
license;88 
● the mere promotion of competition is not sufficient as a public 
interest.89 
ii. Compulsory licenses on public interest grounds 
If the patentee is unwilling to grant a license for reasonable 
remuneration and if there is a public interest in such a license, a 
compulsory license shall be granted to the license seeker (Sec. 24(1) No. 2 
GPA). The presence of a public interest is determined according to the 
general criteria mentioned in chapter D.1.i. So far, Sec. 24(1) GPA has 
gained traction mainly in the pharmaceutical field90 and recent case-law 
seems to indicate its relevance is even growing there.91 An abusive 
exploitation of the patent by the patentee is not a necessary requirement for 
the grant of a compulsory license under Sec. 24 GPA.92 Nor does the 
license seeker’s unsuccessful offer (Sec. 24(1) No. 1 GPA) have to meet 
the requirements for a compulsory license (defense) under competition law 
(see chapter D.3.).93 A compulsory license is not warranted, however, 
where equivalent ways to satisfy the public interest exist.94 
The compulsory license is an exception to the rule that the patent 
holder remains free to decide whether and how to grant licenses ensuring 
 
84 RG Feb. 11, 1903, I 291/02.      
85 RG Aug. 16, 1935, I 44/35.      
86 BGH, supra note 77; BPatG, June 7, 1991, 3 Li 1/90.      
87 Rogge & Kober-Dehm, supra note 78, at ¶ 21.      
88 Id. at ¶ 16.       
89 Id.       
90  See Mes, supra note 39, at ¶ 2; BPatG Aug. 31, 2016, 3 LiQ 1/16; BPatG June 7, 1991, 3 Li 
1/90 (discussing a compulsory license revoked on the basis of different assessment of facts in BGH       
Dec. 5, 1995, X ZR 26/92). 
91 BPatG  Aug. 31, 2016, 3 LiQ 1/16; BGH July 11, 2017, X ZB 2/17; Wilhelmi, supra note 76, 
at ¶ 27 with further references. 
92 Mes, supra note 39, at ¶ 14.      
93 BPatG Aug. 31, 2016, 3 LiQ 1/16 (EP). 
94 Rogge, supra note 78, at ¶ 16.       
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use of the patented invention for the benefit of the public interest. .95 
Hence, the burden of proving its prerequisites lies with the license seeker.96 
If it can show they are fulfilled, there is no judicial discretion, the license 
seeker has a claim to the compulsory license (Sec. 24 (1), 81 (1), 84 
GPA),97 and the court has to grant it.98  
The license seeker can enforce its compulsory license claim by way of 
an action before the Federal Patent Court (Sec. 81 GPA). The Patent Act 
also allows, in case of urgency, for the grant of a compulsory license as an 
interim measure (Sec. 84 GPA).99 The result of the court decision granting 
a compulsory license is not an outright license contract between the parties 
but the legalization of the patent use100 and a statutory, non-exclusive 
license at the conditions101 – especially the royalties – determined by the 
court.102 At least hitherto – and in contrast to competition law-based 
compulsory licenses (cf. chapter D.3.) – patent infringers could not use 
pending proceedings regarding a compulsory license under Sec. 24 GPA as 
a defense against the patentee’s claim for an injunction.103 A decision — 
including preliminary rulings — granting a compulsory license can, 
however, be raised in the infringement proceedings and prevent an 
injunction.104 Furthermore, the infringer can try to have the infringement 
court stay the injunction proceedings with regard to the pending 
compulsory license proceedings if the compulsory license is requested with 
retroactive effect and the court sees a sufficient likelihood in regard with 
the requirements mentioned above that it will be awarded.105 
 
95 If the possible uses are sufficiently researched or evaluated by the patentee himself, if an 
equivalent medicinal product or therapy is available for treatment, s     ee, e.g., BGH Dec. 5, 1995, X 
ZR 26/92;  Wilhelmi, supra note 76, at ¶ 85     . 
96 See BGH Dec. 5, 1995, X ZR 26/92. 
97 Mes, supra note 39, at ¶¶ 30, 33; Wilhelmi, supra note 76, at ¶¶ 5, 48.      
98 Wilhelmi, supra note 76, at ¶ 25 with reference to RG June 29, 1943, I 79/42. 
99      See Mes, supra note 39, ¶33; Wilhelmi, supra note 76b, ¶77.      
100 BGH, July 11, 1995, X ZR 99/92.      
101 See Mes, supra note 39, at ¶ 35; Wilhelmi, supra note 76,at  ¶ 52 (discussing typical contents 
of a compulsory license and that inter alia, the license can be limited in scope and subject to case-
specific obligations on the licensee). 
102 Mes, supra note 39, at ¶¶ 33, 43.      
103 Pitz, supra note 29, at ¶ 198.      
104 Cf. Rogge, supra note 78, at ¶ 36; Wilhelmi, supra note 76, at ¶ 85.      
105 Michael Nieder, Zwangslizenzklage – Neues Verteidigungsmittel im 
Patentverletzungsprozess?, 9/10 MITTEILUNGEN DER DEUTSCHEN PATENTANWÄLTE 400, 
401 (2001); Pitz, supra note 29, at ¶ 139.      
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iii. Expropriation orders on public interest grounds 
Another key provision on public interest considerations is Sec. 13(1) 
GPA which states, in pertinent part:  
“(1) The patent shall have no effect in a case where the Federal 
Government orders that the invention is to be used in the interest of 
public welfare. Further, it shall not extend to a use of the invention 
which is ordered in the interest of the security of the Federal 
Republic of Germany by the competent highest federal authority or 
by a subordinate authority acting on its instructions. [. . .] 
(3) In the cases referred to in subsection (1), the proprietor of the 
patent shall be entitled to equitable remuneration from the Federal 
Republic of Germany.” 
As to its legal nature, Sec. 13 GPA is — today mainly106 — 
considered not as a compulsory license provision but as a provision 
permitting an expropriation of the patentee in the sense of Sec. 14(3) GC, 
in exchange for an equitable remuneration. The expropriation order does, 
however, not invalidate the patent altogether, it is —and must strictly be107 
— limited to the timespan and forms of use necessary to achieve the public 
interest goals.108 Sec. 13 GPA is considered to be coherent with Sec. 31 
TRIPS.109 Its practical relevance is quite low110 and the most interesting 
aspects regarding Sec. 13 GPA do (today) probably relate not so much to 
how the provision plays out in practice but to what it tells about the 
interplay between patents, general notions of property (protection), and 
public interest, in particular from a constitutional and economic viewpoint. 
As to some details of the provision, “public welfare” (Sec. 13(1)(1) 
GPA) is interpreted in a narrower sense than “public interest” in Sec. 24 
GPA, addressing natural disasters, epidemics, attacks using biological 
weapons, and suchlike gruesome events.111 “Interest[s] of the security” 
(Sec. 13(1)(2) GPA) mainly addresses police or military concerns, as well 
as the protection of the population during catastrophic events.112 The 
 
106 RG Sept. 28, 1921, I 46/21; German Patent Act, supra note 4, at § 14(2) (reflecting the public 
good-limitations to property following).      
107 Uwe Scharen, PATG § 13 [BESCHRÄNKUNG DER WIRKUNG FÜR ÖFFENTLICHE 
WOHLFAHRT UND STAATSSICHERHEIT], in PATENTGESETZ: GEBRAUCHSMUSTERGESETZ ¶ 8 
(Benkard Georg ed., 11th ed. 2015).      
108 BGH Feb. 21, 1989, X ZR 53/87.      
109 Scharen, supra note 108, at ¶ 2.      
110 OLG Frankfurt PMZ 1949, 330. 
111 Christofer Lenz & Kieser Timo, Schutz vor Milizbrandangriffen durch Angriffe auf den 
Patschtschutz?, 6 NJW 401 (2002). For a pre-WWII case-law example, cf. RG Mar.03, 1928, I 242/27, 
RGZ 120, 267 (protection of miners). 
112 Scharen, supra note 108, at ¶ 6. 
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expropriating “order” must be cloaked in the form of an administrative act 
specifying the (extent of the) public use to be made of the invention.113 
Importantly, an order under Sec. 13 GPA shall only be issued if use of the 
patented invention cannot be ensured by other means, such as a 
(compulsory) license or less extensive administrative orders.114 An 
expropriation decision under Sec. 13 GPA can be appealed (Art. 19(4)(1) 
FL; Sec. 78(1) No. 1, Sec. 68(1) No. 1 Code of Administrative Court 
Procedure in case of a Government/highest federal authority decision; 
Sec. 40, 42, 68(1)(1), (2), Sec. 70 Code of Administrative Court Procedure 
in case of a decision by a subordinate authority).  
2. Compulsory license according to Sec. 24(2) GPA 
Sec. 24(2) GPA provides for the grant of a compulsory license in 
dependent patent scenarios. Instead of a specific public interest, the 
provision requires that the dependent patent embodies an important 
technical progress of considerable economic potential compared with the 
invention underlying the earlier patent.115 In addition, the conditions of Sec. 
24 (1) No. 1 GPA must be fulfilled (except public interest), viz. the license 
seeker must have made unsuccessful efforts within a reasonable period of 
time to obtain the consent of the patentee to use the protected invention on 
reasonable commercial terms (cf. chapter D.1.ii.). By way of compensation 
for the grant of a compulsory license, the owner of the earlier patent may 
request a counter-license from the license seeker on reasonable terms (Sec. 
24 (2)). 
Based on Art. 5 A of the Paris Union Convention for the Protection of 
Industrial Property and Sec. 31 TRIPs almost all European countries have 
incorporated legal standards which provide for the right to a compulsory 
license.116 
 
113 Id. at ¶ 3. 
114 Id. at ¶ 4; Alfred Keuekenschijver, §13 (Staatliche Benutzungsanordnung), in Patentgesetz: 
unter Berücksichtigung des Europäischen Patentübereinkommens, der Regelungen zum Patent mit 
einheitlicher Wirkung und des Patentzusammenarbeitsvertrags mit Patentkostengesetz, 
Gebrauchsmustergesetz und Gesetz über den Schutz der Topographien von Halbleitererzeugnissen, 
Gesetz über Arbeitnehmererfindungen und Gesetz über internationale Patentübereinkommen ¶ 8 (Busse 
et al. eds., 9th ed. Walter de Gruyter GmbH 2016). 
115 Mes, supra note 39, at ¶ 20; Wilhelmi, supra note 76, at §24 ¶ 37. 
116 Johann Pitz, Compulsory Licensing in the “Public Interest”, 3 ACTA SCI. MED. SCI. 77, 78 
(2019) .  
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3. Competition law 
It is, meanwhile, a well-established principle in German and EU law 
that competition law rules can impact patent law, especially by limiting the 
claims and exclusivity rights of patent holders.117 This paper can focus only 
on a particularly conspicuous vein of this impact, namely on the 
competition law-based duty of a market dominant patent holder to grant, 
under certain conditions, a compulsory license to its patents, especially if 
these patents qualify as essential to an ICT standard. The paper must, thus, 
omit other interesting facets, such as limitations to patent injunctions 
stemming from unfair competition rules. 
i. The initial German cases: Standard-Spundfass and Orange Book 
The concept that a SEP holder can abuse its dominant market position 
(if present) and violate Sec. 19, 20 German Competition Act — 
GCA/Art. 102 TFEU by refusing to grant a license at FRAND conditions118 
is both recent and already widely accepted in Germany. The German 
Federal Court of Justice has acknowledged this concept in its Standard-
Spundfass119 and Orange Book120 decisions, holding that the implementer 
may, in such cases, be entitled to a competition law-based compulsory 
license and that this entitlement can serve as a defense121 against the claim 
for injunctive relief (kartellrechtlicher Zwangslizenzeinwand).  
However, the threshold for a competition law-based compulsory 
license (defense) set in Orange Book and subsequent decisions by lower 
 
117 See BGH May 6, 2009, KZR 39-06; Case C-170/13, Huawei Tech. v. ZTE Corp., 2015 EUR-
Lex, 62013CJ0170; Case C-238/87, AB Volvo v. Erik Veng  1988, 
http://curia.europa.eu/juris/liste.jsf?language=en&num=C-238/87; Unwired Int'l v. Huawei Tech. 
[2017] EWHC 711 (Pat) (Eng.); Commission Decision, AT.39939, 2014 O.J. (C 350) 8; ANDREAS 
HEINEMANN, IMMATERIALGÜTERSCHUTZ IN DER WETTBEWERBSORDNUNG, EINE 
GRUNDLAGENORIENTIERTE UNTERSUCHUNG ZUM KARTELLRECHT DES GEISTIGEN EIGENTUMS  178 et 
seq., 321 et seq. (Mohr Siebeck 1st ed. 2002); Marias Pregartbauer, Der Anspruch auf Unterlassung aus 
standardessentiellen Patenten im Telekommunikationssektor, 2 (2017), 
https://www.researchgate.net/publication/321347891_Der_Anspruch_auf_Unterlassung_aus_standardes
sentiellen_Patenten_im_Telekommunikationssektor. 
118 On the interplay between competition law, patent law, and standard-setting in general, as well 
as on the fact that SEP ownership does not automatically result in dominance, cf. Christian Dobler & 
Sattler Sven, Das Spannungsfeld von Wettbewerb, geistigem Eigentum und Standardisierung—
Problemaufriss, Konfliktfelder und Lösungsansätze, in KARTELLRECHT IN THEORIE UND PRAXIS, 
FESTSCHRIFT FÜR CORNELIUS CANENBLEY ZUM 143 et seq. (C.H. Beck 1 ed. 2012). 
119  BGH July 13, 2004, KZR 40/02. 
120  BGH May 6, 2009, KZR 39-06. 
121 In order to justify that the compulsory license can serve as a defense, the Court relies on the 
argument that conduct prohibited under antitrust law must not be backed by the grant of injunctive 
relief; BGH May 6, 2009, KZR 39-06. 
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courts was quite a high one:122 According to the case-law, the patentee acts 
abusively only if, first, the license seeker has made an unconditional offer 
to conclude a license agreement which the patentee cannot refuse without 
violating competition law by committing a discriminatory or exclusionary 
abuse.123 Second, if the seeking company is already using the patent, it 
must comply with its obligations under the offered license prior to the 
acceptance of the offer by the patent holder.124 This means, in particular, 
that it must already pay the offered royalties, albeit in escrow.125 If the 
license seeker considers the license fees requested by the patent holder to 
be excessive or if the patent holder refuses to quantify royalties, the license 
seeker can base the offer for a license agreement on license fees to be 
determined by the patent holder at its reasonable discretion.126   
The Federal Supreme Court’s Orange Book decision has provoked 
much criticism.127 The main group of detractors argues, essentially, that the 
approach is too harsh on the technology user – thereby violating the 
principle of effectiveness regarding the application of Art. 102 TFEU.128 
They justify their refusal by stating that it can be very difficult to determine 
and submit appropriate license conditions,129 that Orange Book envisages 
not even an evidence check of whether deposited royalties are 
appropriate,130 that the technology user is not entitled to a grace period for 
assessing whether a continuing infringement is actually taking place,131 and 
that a duty of the user to define license conditions does not square well 
 
122 See also Peter Picht, Strategisches Verhalten bei der Nutzung von Patenten in 
Standardisierungsverfahren aus der Sicht des europäischen Kartellrechts 392 et seq. (Springer- 
Verlag Berlin Heidelberg, 1st ed. 2014). 
123 BGH May 6, 2009, KZR 39-06 . 
124 Id. at ¶ 29. 
125 Id. 
126 Id. at ¶ 39. 
127 For an overview, see Picht, supra note 123, at 39 et seq. 
128 Phillip Maume & Caluda Tapia, Der Zwangslizenzeinwand ein Jahr nach Orange Book 
Standard – mehr Fragen als Antworten, 11 GRUR INT’L 923, 95, 925 (2010); Andreas Heinemann, 
BGH MissbräuchlichkeSit bei Verweigerung eines Lizenzvertrags – Orange-Book-Standard, 8 LMK 
286659 (2009); G.K. De Bronett,Gemeinschaftsrechtliche Anmerkungen zum ‚Orange-Book-Standard‘-
Urteil des BGH, 9 WUW 899 (2009). 
129 Hanns Ullrich, Patents and Standards – A Comment on the German Federal Supreme Court 
Decision Orange Book Standard, 3 ICC 377, 343 et seq., 347 et seq. (2010); see also Michael Fröhlich, 
Standards und Patente – Die ETSI IPR Policy, 3 GRUR 205, 213 (2008);  PATENTS AND 
TECHNOLOGICAL PROGRESS IN A GLOBALIZED WORLD,  177, 189 (Prinz zu Waldeck und Pyrmont, W. 
et al., eds., Springer-Verlag 2009); Hanns Ullrich, Patente und technische Normen: Konflikt und 
Komplementarität in patent-und wettbewerbsrechtlicher Sicht, EUROPÄISCHE PERSPEKTIVEN DES 
GEISTIGEN EINGENTUMS 14, 50 et seq. (Mohr Sieeck 2010). 
130 Maume & Tapia, supra note 129, at 925. 
131 Cf. id. at 924 et seq. (arguing for a grace period of three months, especially in case of 
technology standards creating a risk of multiple patent infringement). 
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with the general competition law rules on refusal to supply.132 Others 
criticize, on the contrary, that the Orange Book approach erodes patent 
protection and neglects the legal nature of patents as exclusive property 
rights.133 Reflecting the main critique, the EU Commission and the CJEU 
chose – as the next part of this paper will show – an approach that is 
considerably more implementer-friendly. However, this has not necessarily 
rendered the Orange Book mechanism irrelevant.134 Instead, the CJEU may 
have left room for the “Orange Book-test” where the facts differ from those 
of the Huawei/ZTE case, in particular because the standard at issue is not a 
so-called “de jure-standard”, established by a standard-setting organization 
(SSO), but a “de facto-standard”, established by a market participant via 
the market success of its standard-based products.135 At least German 
scholars are still debating whether the Orange Book-test should (continue 
to) apply in these de facto-scenarios or whether it is wiser to switch to the 
Huawei/ZTE-test in de facto-cases, too.136 
ii. The Commission’s Samsung and Motorola cases 
While the EU Commission’s Rambus case dealt with the slightly 
different issue of a so-called “patent ambush”,137 the Commission took an 
early look at the competition law-based compulsory license (defense) in its 
Samsung and Motorola investigations.138 
In December 2012, the Commission expressed competition concerns 
about Samsung’s enforcement of its SEPs and in April 2013 the 
Commission issued a further Statement of Objections against Motorola.139 
In both Statements of Objection, the Commission expressed the view that 
an enforcement of injunctive relief claims based on SEPs may, 
 
132 Ullrich, supra note 130, at 343 et seq.; Pregartbauer, supra note 118, at 90 et seq. 
133 Daniel Hötte, BGH: Zulässigkeit des kartellrechtlichen Zwangslizenzeinwands – Orange-
Book-Standard, 10 MMR 686, 690 (2009). 
134 See Picht, supra note 123, at 423, 554 et seq.; Pregartbauer, supra note 118, at 89 et seq. 
135 Cf. supra Section D.1. for a discussion on the Orange Book-test as part of the proportionality 
test. 
136 In favor of Orange Book: Christoph Palzer, Patentrechtsdurchsetzung als Machtmissbrauch – 
der Zwangslizenzeinwand aus unionsrechtlicher Sicht, 18 EUZW 702, 706 (2015); in favor of the 
application of an (albeit adapted) Huawei/ZTE-test Peter Picht, The ECJ Rules on Standard-Essential 
Patents: Thoughts and Issues Post-Huawei, 37 EUR. COMPETITION L. REV. 365, 371 (2016). 
137 Commission Decision, C-COMP/38.636, 2014 O.J. (C 344) 6; Picht, supra note 123,  passim. 
138 Commission Decision,  AT.39985, 2014 O.J. (C 344) 6; Commission Decision,  AT.39939, 
O.J. (C 350) 8. 
139 Cf. Tilman Müller & Henke Volkmar, Patentdurchsetzung als Kartellrechtsverstoß. Die 
Entscheidungen der EU-Kommission in Sachen Samsung und Motorola, 7 GRUR INT’L 662, 662 
(2014). 
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exceptionally, constitute an abuse of a dominant position if the patentee has 
agreed, in a “FRAND declaration”, to license these patents on terms that 
are “fair, reasonable and non-discriminatory” and if the opponent has 
expressed its willingness to take such a license on FRAND terms.140 In the 
Samsung decision, the Commission applied these criteria and accepted a 
commitment by Samsung not to enforce the respective SEPs for 
smartphones and tablets in Europe, provided that the implementer agrees to 
take out a FRAND license, the terms of which are to be determined by 
court (or arbitration) if necessary.141 Under this concept, patent infringers 
can escape an injunction by declaring a rather unspecific willingness to 
license and by agreeing to accept, after a certain negotiation period, the 
binding determination of license terms by a court (or arbitral tribunal).142 In 
addition, the implementer remains free to challenge validity or 
infringement of the respective patents.143  
The test for determining whether an implementer qualifies as a 
“willing” licensee was at the heart not only of the Commission’s Samsung 
and Motorola investigations but also of a referral144 to the CJEU made by 
the Düsseldorf Regional Court. Perceiving – and rightly so – a divergence 
between the patentee-friendly approach in Orange Book and the rather 
implementer-friendly position of the EU Commission, the Düsseldorf Court 
triggered, in its search for clarification, a seminal decision on the 
interaction between patent and competition law.  
iii. The CJEU’s commandments: Huawei v. ZTE 
Answering to the questions from Düsseldorf, the CJEU held, in its 
decision Huawei v. ZTE,145 that “the Court must strike a balance between 
maintaining free competition — in respect of which primary law and, in 
particular, Article 102 TFEU prohibit abuses of a dominant position — and 
the requirement to safeguard [a] proprietor’s intellectual-property rights 
and its right to effective judicial protection, guaranteed by Article 17(2) 
and Article 47 of the Charter, respectively.”146 However, it is “settled case-
 
140 Commission Decision,  AT.39985, O.J. (C 344) 6; Commission Decision, AT.39939, O.J. (C 
350) 8. 
141 European Commission, Press Release IP/14/490, Antitrust: Commission Accepts Legally 
Binding Commitments by Samsung Electronics on Standard Essential Patent Injunctions (Apr. 29, 
2014). 
142 Müller & Henke, supra note 140, at 663.. 
143 Id. 
144 LG Düsseldorf Mar. 21, 2013, 4b O 104/12. 
145 Case C-170/13, Huawei Tech. v. ZTE Corp., 2015 EUR-Lex, 62013CJ0170. 
146 Id. at ¶ 42. 
GERMAN LAW ON PATENT INJUNCTIONS 1/6/2020 2:34 PM 
2019  German Law on Patent Injunctions: Legal Framework and Recent Developments 235 
 
law that the exercise of an exclusive right linked to an intellectual-property 
right by the proprietor may, in exceptional circumstances, involve abusive 
conduct for the purposes of Article 102 TFEU”.147 Since the enforcement 
of an injunctive relief against standard essential patents “prevent[s] 
products manufactured by competitors from appearing or remaining on the 
market” and “having regard to the fact that an undertaking to grant licences 
on FRAND terms creates legitimate expectations on the part of third parties 
that the proprietor of the SEP will in fact grant licences on such terms, a 
refusal by the proprietor of the SEP to grant a licence on those terms may, 
in principle, constitute an abuse within the meaning of Article 102 
TFEU.”148 However, a “fair balance between the interests concerned” must 
be ensured.149 In order for the action for injunctive relief not to be regarded 
as abusive in this context, the patentee must comply with certain 
conditions:150 Before bringing an action, the patentee must indicate the 
patent infringement, the patent concerned and how the patent is alleged to 
have been infringed. If the alleged infringer has expressed its intention to 
conclude a license agreement on FRAND terms, the patentee is required to 
submit to the infringing but license-willing company a concrete written 
license offer and, in particular, indicate the license fee and how it was 
calculated. The alleged patent infringer must react to the offer in 
accordance with commercial practices in the field and in good faith. If it 
does not accept the offer, it must make a concrete counter-offer at FRAND 
conditions within a short period of time. From the time at which this 
counter-offer is rejected by the patent holder, the license seeker already 
using the patent must provide adequate security, e.g. by providing a bank 
guarantee or by depositing the required amounts. It must be possible to 
present an exact account of the past acts of use. If the patent infringer’s 
conduct does not meet these requirements or if it practices delaying tactics, 
the allegation of abuse against the patent holder does not apply.  
With its Huawei v. ZTE decision, the CJEU has established a test that 
is somewhat closer to the Commission’s position in the Samsung and 
Motorola cases than to Orange Book.151 However, the test is particular in 
that it requires both the patentee and the implementer to follow a step-by-
 
147 Id. at ¶ 47. 
148 Id. at ¶ 52 et seq. 
149 Id. at ¶ 55. 
150 Cf. Andreas Heinemann, Standardessenzielle Patente in Normenorganisationen. 
Kartellrechtliche Vorgaben für die Einlösung von Lizenzierungsversprechen, 9 GRUR 855, 859 (2015) 
(containing a detailed analysis). 
151 Id. at 858. 
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step pattern of negotiations leading up — hopefully — to the consensual 
establishment of a FRAND license. In essence, it is the patentee’s violation 
of its conduct requirements under this pattern that entitles the implementer 
to the compulsory license-defense.152 
In the wake of Huawei/ZTE, EU Member State courts, in particular 
those in Germany and the UK, are now in the process of detailing and 
carrying on the CJEU’s approach.153 While it is clear from this caselaw, as 
well as from a plethora of publications on the topic154 that German and EU 
competition law155  grant a competition law-based compulsory license 
defense, the details regarding this defense and, hence, the availability of 
SEP-based injunctions in case the defense fails, are by no means 
completely settled. It is not possible for this contribution to present all the 
 
152 Case C-170/13, Huawei Tech. v. ZTE Corp., 2015 EUR-Lex, 62013CJ0170. 
153 This section is based on Peter Picht, The Future of FRAND Injunctions, GRUR (forthcoming 
2019). For an analysis of recent case-law, see Peter Picht, Unwired Planet v. Huawei: A Seminal 
SEP/FRAND Decision from the UK, GRUR INT’L 569, 579 (2017); Peter Picht, ‘FRAND wars 2.0‘ – 
Rechtsprechung im Anschluss an die Huawei/ZTE-Entscheidung des EuGH, 68 WUW 234 (2018); Peter 
Picht, Neues SEP/FRAND-Recht vom englischen Court of Appeal: Unwired Planet ./. Huawei und 
Conversant ./. Huawei & ZTE, 4 MITTEILUNGEN DER DEUTSCHEN PATENTANWÄLTE 146, 150 (2019). 
154 As a selection of FRAND/SEP publications from Germany, see Antje Baumann, Einschaltung 
von Schiedsgerichten zur Bestimmung der FRAND-Konditionen, 2 GRUR 145 (2018); Constantin Kurtz 
& Wolfgang Straub, Die Bestimmung des FRAND-Lizenzsatzes für SEP, 2 GRUR 136 (2018); Peter 
Picht, Standardsetzung und Patentmissbrauch – Schlagkraft und Entwicklungsbedarf des europäischen 
Kartellrechts, 1 GRUR INT’L) 1 (2014); Picht, supra note 137; Picht (2017), supra note 154; Picht 
(2018), supra note 154; Ronny Hauck, Schutz von Unternehmensgeheimnissen bei der Bestimmung 
FRAND-konformer Lizenzbedingungen, 5 GRUR-PRAX 118 (2017); Ronny Hauck & Dietrich Kamlah, 
Was ist ‘FRAND‘? Inhaltliche Fragen zu kartellrechtlichen Zwangslizenzen nach Huawei/ZTE, 5 
GRUR INT’L. 420 (2016); Thomas Kühnen, Der kartellrechtliche Zwangslizenzeinwand und seine 
Berücksichtigung im Patentverletzungsprozess, ERHARD KELLER, FESTSCHRIFT FÜR WINFRIED TILMAN 
ZUM 65. GEBURTSTAG, 513 et seq. (Carl Heymann 1st ed. 2003); Phillip Eckel, Anspruch auf 
Lizenzeinräumung aus FRAND-Erklärungen bei standardessentiellen Patenten – Teil 1, 8 NZKART 408 
(2017); Phillip Eckel, Anspruch auf Lizenzeinräumung aus FRAND-Erklärungen bei 
standardessentiellen Patenten – Teil 2, 9 NZKart 469 (2017); Christian Kau, Umsetzung der FRAND-
Entscheidung des EuGH in der deutschen Instanzrechtsprechung, 3 GRUR-PRAX 65 (2017); Jonas 
Block, Achtzehn Monate nach EuGH ‘Huawei/ZTE‘, Die Rechtsprechung der deutschen 
Instanzgerichte, 2 GRUR 121 (2017); Stephan Altmeyer & Christopher Weber, Rückzahlung von 
Lizenzgebühren bei rückwirkender Vernichtung eines SEP?, 12 GRUR 1182 (2017); Markus Lubitz, 
Zwangslizenzierung bei standardessenziellen Patenten (SEP) im Lichte von Sisvel/Haier, 12 NZKART 
618 (2017); Reto M. Hilty & Peter R. Slowinski, Standardessentielle Patente – Perspektiven außerhalb 
des Kartellrechts, 9 GRUR INT’L 781 (2015); Theo Bodewig, Einige Überlegungen zur Erschöpfung 
bei Zwangslizenzen an standardessentiellen Patenten, 15 GRUR INT’L 626 (2015); Heinemann, supra 
note 151; Torsten Körber, Missbräuchliche Patentunterlassungsklagen vor dem Aus?, 6 NZKART 239 
(2013); Torsten Körber, Kartellrechtlicher Zwangslizenzeinwand und standardessentielle Patente, 13 
NZKART 87 (2013); Palzer, supra note 137; Clemens-August Heusch, Missbrauch 
marktbeherrschender Stellungen (Art. AEUV Artikel 102 AEUV) durch Patentinhaber ‘Orange-Book-
Standard‘ und was die Instanzgerichte daraus gemacht haben, 8 GRUR 745 (2014). 
155 German courts and agencies have to apply EU competition law alongside with German 
competition law on the abuse of dominance; RAINER BECHTHOLD & WOLFGANG BOSCH, GESETZ 
GEGEN WETTBEWERBSBESCHRÄNKUNGEN, KOMMENTAR, § 19 ¶ 99 (C.H.Beck 2018). An assessment of 
German law in this regard can, therefore, not leave EU competition law aside. 
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injunction-related SEP/FRAND case-law but section D.3. will highlight at 
least a selection of interesting topics.  
4. General abuse of rights doctrine, Sec. 242 GCC 
In general German civil law, the abuse of a right is usually interpreted 
as one form of violating the duty to “perform according to the requirements 
of good faith, taking customary practice into consideration” (Sec. 242 
GCC). 156 Courts have considered the exercise of patent rights to constitute 
such an abuse in a number of settings, including the enforcement of claims 
based on a patent which had been acquired by way of misrepresentations to 
the patent office; 157 contradictory positions the patentee defends in the 
infringement proceedings and in the validity proceedings respectively;158 or 
the forfeiture of rights due to lapse of time.159 On the relevance of Sec. 242 
GCC in the context of recent discussions about injunction law reform, cf. 
below section F.  
5. Personal characteristics of the patentee or infringer  
In some cases, injunctions are not successful because of who claims 
the injunction or against whom the injunction is claimed. Potential 
restrictions on injunctions requested by “patent trolls” are the most 
prominent topic at present, but there exist some other constellations as well.  
i. Infringers 
One may say that indirect/contributory infringers and co-liable 
persons (Störer) cannot be targeted as long as the specific requirements for 
an injunction against them are not met. Natural or legal persons can lack 
the capacity to be sued-although being somehow linked to the actual 
infringer-if this link is considered too tenuous. Examples are other groups 
in the holding to which the infringing company belongs160 or — in a sense 
— civil servants who have committed an infringement for which, however, 
 
156 Holger Sutschet, BGB § 242 Leistung nach Treu und Glauben, BECKOK BGB, ¶ 47 et seq. 
(Georg Bamberger et al. eds.,C.H. Beck 2019). 
157 RG, Mar. 25, 1933, I 226/32, RGZ 140; Josef Kohler, LEHRBUCH DES PATENTRECHTS, 162 
(Bensheimer 1888 – double check date?) .This position has been criticized in the academic literature, cf. 
e.g. Rainer Schulte, PATENTGESETZ MIT EUROPÄISCHEM PATENTÜBEREINKOMMEN: KOMMENTAR, § 
9  ¶ 79 (Carl Heymanns Verlag 10 ed. 2017); Mes, supra note 39,  at § 9  ¶ 79. 
158 BGH June 5, 1997, X ZR 73/95. 
159 BGH Dec. 19, 2000, X ZR 150/98. 
160 OLG Düsseldorf Feb. 16, 2006, I-2 U 32/04; Carmen Buxbaum, Konzernhaftung bei 
Patentverletzung durch die Tochtergesellschaft, 3-4 GRUR 240-245 (2009). 
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the state is held liable (Amtshaftung – public liability).161 The situation is 
similar for those protected by a license contract (Sec. 15(2) GPA), (the 
right to) a compulsory license (Sec. 24 GPA), or some other legal position 
as a result of which they are not considered to have committed an 
infringement. To the extent the economic effects of an injunction on the 
defendant are considered in gauging the proportionality of the injunction, 
characteristics such as the SME status of the defendant can become 
relevant. We will say more on this aspect in section D.6. below.  
ii. Plaintiffs 
On the side of the plaintiff/patent owner, the treatment of so-called 
“non-producing entities” (NPEs)162 is paramount. It follows from the 
almost “automatic nexus” between infringement and injunction (on 
limitations cf. section D.7.) in German statutory patent law, as well as from 
a relatively patentee-friendly tradition in German case-law,163 that — so far 
— courts do not systematically deny injunctive relief to a certain type of 
plaintiffs.164 Some decisions have been restrictive in granting injunctions to 
NPEs in the context of temporary relief165 or the provisional enforcement of 
first-instance decisions.166 However, with regard to NPEs enforcing patents 
in the particularly sensitive field of ICT-SEPs, the Düsseldorf Higher 
Regional Court has underlined, in a high-profile FRAND case, that they 
should not a priori be treated differently from other patentees.167  
In a more recent decision,168 though, the same court has established 
some boundaries regarding the enforcement of SEPs acquired by an NPE 
from the original patent holder. It is of vital importance, in such cases, 
whether a FRAND declaration made by the previous patent owner obliges 
the acquirer to offer licenses on FRAND conditions to standard-
implementers as well, or whether the acquirer remains free to seek an 
injunction even though an implementer proves willing to take such a 
license. Sometimes, an acquiring NPE will have made its own FRAND 
declaration, for instance because the relevant standard was set only after 
 
161 BGH, Sept. 21, 1978, X ZR 56/77, ¶ 24. 
162 There is no obligation to use a patent in German patent law; Pitz supra note 29, § 139 ¶ 75. 
163 Jorge L. Contreras & Peter Georg Picht, Patent Assertion Entities and Legal Exceptionalism 
in Europe and the United States, A Comparative View, MAX PLANCK INSTITUTE FOR INNOVATION & 
COMPETITION, Research Paper No. 17-11, 6 (2017). 
164 Cf. Osterrieth, supra note 47, at 542. 
165 LG Düsseldorf, July 8, 1999, 4 O 187/99. 
166 OLG Karlsruhe, May 11, 2009, 6 U 38/09. 
167 OLG Düsseldorf Jan. 13, 2016, I-15 U 66/15. 
168 OLG Düsseldorf Mar. 22, 2019, 4b O 49/14. 
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the patent acquisition or because the acquirer contractually undertook to do 
so, but there is no guarantee and implementers may, hence, have to seek 
refuge from an injunction in the previous patentee’s FRAND declaration. 
Coming to their rescue, the Düsseldorf Court held that the acquirer of a 
SEP is directly and indispensably bound to the FRAND declaration of its 
predecessor, even absent an express or implied declaration to this effect.169 
In the Court’s view, the FRAND licensing commitment has the effect that 
the patentee no longer holds an exclusivity right which would allow to 
permit or prohibit use of the patent at its holder’s discretion. Instead, as a 
result of the FRAND declaration, the rights from the patent are now limited 
by the obligation to allow access on FRAND terms. Very importantly, the 
Court seems – the language of the decision is somewhat ambiguous 
regarding the doctrinal level but it may draw on a similar proposal in the 
literature170 – to derive this limitation not from a contractual promise, the 
lack of which could remove the limitation, but from a modification of the 
patent in rem due to a waiver contained in the patentee’s FRAND 
declaration. Hence, the owner can transfer its patent only together with the 
FRAND “encumbrance” and the presence or absence of an additional 
FRAND declaration by the acquirer has no impact on the FRAND licensing 
obligation. Nor can, according to this Düsseldorf decision,171 the acquirer 
usually claim an injunction if an implementer refuses to license the SEP on 
terms incompatible with those offered by the previous patentee. This is 
because the Court finds, based i.a. on Sec. 15(3) GPA,172 that the previous 
FRAND commitment binds the acquirer not only in a general way, but also 
regarding the licensing practice of the previous patent holder. Existing 
license agreements, in particular, do not end or alter in their terms and 
conditions only because of the transfer. As another – and, for once, 
patentee-friendly – implication of these findings, the Düsseldorf Court 
perceives no competition law violation where the contractual arrangements 
between patent seller and buyer do not explicitly oblige the buyer to make 
or honor a FRAND commitment since the FRAND obligation travels with 
the patent anyway.173 In consequence, an implementer, especially one who 
is not willing to take a FRAND license, cannot raise the absence of such a 
 
169 See id. at ¶ 203 et seq. 
170 See Ullrich, Patente und technische Normen, supra note 130, at 14, 90 et seq. 
171 See OLG Düsseldorf 22.03.2019, 4b O 49/14. 
172 German Patent Act, supra note 4, Sec. 15(3) (A transfer of rights or the grant of a license 
shall not affect licenses previously granted to third parties). 
173 OLG Düsseldorf Mar. 22, 2019, 4b O 49/14. 
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contractual obligation as a competition law-defense against the acquirer’s 
injunction claim.  
6. Proportionality 
German courts do take proportionality aspects in consideration where 
they have room for exercising judicial discretion, such as in the granting of 
interim injunctions or in the decision on provisional enforceability of 
injunctions.174 However, in German patent law, the claim to an injunction is 
not subject to a general proportionality requirement or a balancing of the 
parties’ interests.175 While proportionality is explicitly mentioned in 
Sec. 140a GPA (claim for destruction of products) and Sec. 140b GPA 
(claim for information), Sec. 139 GPA, as the core provision on 
injunctions, does not explicitly establish a proportionality threshold.176 Nor 
is there anything like a broadly available, US-style “eBay” balancing 
test.177  Apart from the settings just mentioned, German courts tend – or at 
least traditionally tended – to create an almost automatic link between the 
establishment of a patent infringement and the granting of an injunction.178 
Many scholars agree that there is no such thing as a general, effective 
proportionality threshold in German patent injunction law.179 This has, as 
said, made the jurisdiction a venue rather attractive to patentees. Recent 
developments may, however, increase the relevance of proportionality 
notions, as we will discuss in chapter F. below. 
7. Further limitations 
There are a few other limitations to injunction claims: First, according 
to Sec. 712(1) CCP, a patent infringer can, in his capacity as debtor of the 
claim to an injunction, file a petition for protection “insofar as the 
enforcement would entail a disadvantage for the debtor that it is impossible 
to compensate or remedy [. . .] The court is to allow him, upon a 
corresponding petition being filed, to avert enforcement by providing 
security or by lodgment, without taking account of any security that the 
 
174 Haft, et al., supra note 6, at 928; Pitz, supra note 29, at § 139 ¶ 76. 
175 Tobias J. Hessel & Maximilian Schnellhorn, Die Rückabwicklung des vorläufig vollstreckten 
Unterlassungstitels im Patentrecht, 7 GRUR 672 (2017); Haft, et al., supra note 6, at 928. 
176 Osterrieth, supra note 47, at 543; cf. Pitz, supra note 117, at ¶ 74. 
177 Contreras & Picht, supra note 164, at 4. 
178 Christian Osterrieth, Technischer Fortschritt – eine Herausforderung für das Patentrecht? Zum 
Gebot der Verhältnismäßigkeit beim patentrechtlichen Unterlassungsanspruch, GRUR 985, 987 (2018). 
179 Hessel & Schnellhorn, supra note 176, at 672; Christian Osterrieth, Patentrecht, ¶ 119 (C.H. 
Beck 2015). 
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creditor may have provided”. Sec. 712(2) CCP states that “the petition filed 
by the debtor shall not be complied with if an overriding interest of the 
creditor contravenes this”. In practice, hurdles for success of such a petition 
are quite high in the patent injunction field.180 
Second, the infringer can raise a complaint based on a violation of his 
right to be heard (Anhörungsrüge, Sec. 321a CCP, Sec. 103(1) FL). If 
successful, the complaint results in a continuation of the (infringement) 
proceedings and the infringer can request that the enforcement of the 
injunction be stayed (Sec. 707 CCP). 
Third, failure to send a warning/cease and desist letter prior to filing 
for an injunction will, in principle, not limit the patentee’s right to an 
injunction. The main legal consequence (strategic disadvantages aside) of 
not sending such warning/cease and desist letter can be that the patentee 
has to bear the litigation costs if the infringer acknowledges the 
infringement (Sec. 93 CCP).181 
Fourth, enforcement of an injunction under Sec. 890 CCP can become 
problematic if the infringer subsequently modifies the contested 
embodiment (angegriffene Ausführungsform) against which the injunction 
has been issued.182  
Fifth, general patent protection requirements obviously have an impact 
on patent injunctions as well. Examples are acts of use permitted under 
Sec. 11 GPA,183 priority rights (Sec. 12 GPA), lapse (Sec. 20 GPA) or 
exhaustion of the patent, usurpation of the invention by the patentee vis-à-
vis the “infringer”, (Sec. 8 GPA), or the free state of the art-defense.184 At 
least some German scholars contend that an injunction, being a future-
oriented remedy, is not admissible where the patent is about to expire.185  
 
180 Osterrieth, supra note 47, at 543 (referencing BGH, June 20, 2000, X ZR 88/00); OLG 
Düsseldorf Nov. 16, 1978, 2 U 15/78. 
181 Osterrieth, supra note 47, at ¶ 1060. On the reduced (e.g.: oral warning sufficient) 
requirements for a sufficient warning before the filing for a preliminary injunction, cf. LG München I 
June 9, 2011, 7 O 2403/11; LG München I Nov. 10, 2010, 21 O 7656/10; OLG Düsseldorf Jan. 12, 
2004. 
182 OLG Frankfurt Apr. 14, 1978, 6 W 12/78; OLG Karlsruhe Nov. 30, 1983, 6 W 88/83; OLG 
Düsseldorf June 10, 2010, 2 U 17/09; LG Düsseldorf July 22, 2005, 4b O 327/04; BGH Nov. 8, 2007, I 
ZR 172/05; BGH Feb. 23, 1973, I ZR 117/71. 
183 German Patent Act, supra note 4, at Sec. 11 (permitting, in principle acts privately done, acts 
for experimental purposes, the extemporaneous preparation for individual cases, the use on board 
vessels and the use in the construction or the operation of aircraft or land vehicles of another State party 
to the Paris Convention for the Protection of Industrial Property, and finally the acts specified in Article 
27 of the Convention on International Civil Aviation of 7 December 1944). 
184 The so-called “Formstein”-defence; cf. BGH Apr. 29, 1986, X ZR 28/85. 
185 Kraßer & Ann, supra note 5, at § 35 ¶ 12. 
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Last but not least, use-by periods, permitting an infringer to sell or use 
infringing products within a certain time period after the injunction has 
been granted, were arguably always possible under German patent law, but 
the option remained a theoretical one as courts were utterly reluctant to 
concede such deferrals. 186 However, use-by periods may become 
somewhat more frequent due to a recent decision of the German Federal 
Supreme Court (cf. section F below). 
E. ALTERNATIVES TO INJUNCTIVE RELIEFS 
The injunction is a core remedy in case of patent infringement, but it 
is by no means the only one. The patentee can combine its injunction claim 
with other civil and criminal patent infringement claims.187 These include, 
in case of intent or negligence, claims for compensation according to 
Sec. 139(2) GPA. Additionally, patentees may — subject to a 
proportionality test (Sec. 140a(4) GPA) — request reparative measures in 
the form of claims for destruction (Sec. 140a(1), (2)GPA), “for recall of the 
products which are the subject-matter of the patent[,] or for definitive 
removal of the products from the channels of commerce” (Sec. 140a(3) 
GPA).188 In specific constellations, these reparative measures may be 
granted although the patentee is not entitled to an injunction. In particular, 
the German Federal Court of Justice has held that a destruction of 
infringing products can be requested even after expiration of the infringed 
patent.189 Furthermore, a patentee can – if the respective requirements are 
fulfilled – claim the provision of information (Sec. 140b GPA), the 
“production of a document or inspection of an item which lies in [the 
infringer’s] control or of a process which is the subject-matter of the 
patent” (Sec. 140c(1) GPA), the production of or access to bank, financial 
or commercial documents (Sec. 140d(1) GPA), as well as the publication of 
a judgment in its favor (Sec. 140e GPA). In addition to the GPA claims, the 
patentee may have claims under general civil law, including termination of 
infringement and removal of its consequences, Sec. 823(1), 1004 GCC; 
unjust enrichment, Sec. 812 et seq. GCC; and/or accounting, Sec. 242, 677, 
681, 666 GCC (by way of analogy). Such GCC claims are declared 
applicable by Sec. 141a GPA. Last but not least, an infringement can 
 
186 Grabinski & Zülch, supra note 5, at ¶ 136. 
187 Kraßer & Ann, supra note 5, at § 33 ¶ 25; Grabinski & Zülch, supra note 5, ¶ 27; Franz 
Hofmann, Unterlassungsanspruch und Verhältnismäßigkeit – Beseitigung, Löschung und Rückruf, 18 
NJW 1290, 1291 (2018). 
188 Osterrieth, supra note 3, at ¶ 26. 
189 BGH Feb. 21, 1989, X ZR 53/87; Kühnen, supra note 67, at ¶ 1405 et seq. 
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trigger criminal and customs sanctions according to Sec. 142 GPA and Sec. 
142a GPA. These additional claims are distinct from and parallel to the 
injunction, i.e. they are not merely a facet and consequence of the claim for 
an injunction and the patentee can pursue them independently. This overall 
infringement claim structure is widely perceived as complying with Sec. 27 
et seq. TRIPS.190 For a long time, it had been firmly established in German 
case-law that other infringement remedies do not constitute an alternative 
to injunctions in the sense that courts would award them in lieu of 
injunctive relief. Instead, injunctions were, and largely still are, regarded as 
an almost indispensable consequence of patent infringement.191 Of late, 
however, a discourse has evolved on whether German injunction rules 
ought to be more flexible, including the award of other remedies in lieu of 
an injunction. We will now turn to this discussion in chapter F.1. of this 
contribution.   
F. RECENT DEVELOPMENTS 
The final part of this contribution highlights a few topics which 
indicate that German patent injunction (case-)law is on the move. Not 
being able to cover all interesting facets of this shift,192 it focusses on the 
potential establishment of a general proportionality threshold and on 
injunctions in German SEP/FRAND cases.  
1. A general proportionality threshold in German patent injunction law?  
i. Applicability and effects of a proportionality threshold  
Of late, German patent law is experiencing a more intensive 
discussion about whether the traditional “automatic link” between 
infringement and injunction should be made more flexible by attaching 
greater importance to considerations of proportionality.  
Those who are in favor of such a shift argue that, as products grow 
more complex and their production more collaborative, producers run a 
 
190 Joseph Straus, Bedeutung des TRIPS für das Patentrecht, 3 GRUR INT’L. 179, 179 et seq. 
(1996); Thomas Dreier, TRIPS und die Durchsetzung vonr Rechten des geitstigen Eigentums, 3 GRUR 
INT’L. 205, 216 et seq. (1996). 
191 Osterrieth, supra note 179, at 987. 
192 For example, we do not address recent research on the application of competition law to 
abusive filings and blocking patents, see Andreas Heinemann, Abusive filing of IP rights, RESEARCH 
HANDBOOK ON INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY AND THE LIFE SCIENCES, 468-481 (Duncan Matthews & 
Herbert Zech eds., Edward Elgar Publishing, Cheltenham 2017);  Ohly, supra note 75, at 787-798; or 
on so-called “predatory innovation” in general, see Thibault Schrepel, Predatory Innovation: The 
Definite Need for Legal Recognition, 21 SMU Sci. & Tech. L. Rev. 19 (2017). 
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greater risk of inadvertently infringing patents on parts of their products, 
especially if they have not manufactured these parts themselves but bought 
them from a supplier.193 An inflexible injunction rule necessitates the 
infringer’s immediate cessation of production and distribution, produces 
conversion costs (where conversion is at all possible), and creates a high 
likelihood for fierce litigation, thereby generating economic 
inefficiencies.194 Courts have, hitherto, focused too much on whether an 
individual feature of a product infringes a single patent and too little on the 
overall product and the accompanying circumstances of the case.195 Owners 
of patents on parts of complex products can leverage their ability to block 
the production and distribution of the entire product, resulting in an 
overcompensation that is not justified by the patent system’s fundamental 
goal to appropriately reward and thereby incentivize innovation.196 
Injunctions in favor of NPEs can create the specific problem of a no-win-
situation because no further use of the patent occurs while the NPE earns 
no returns.197  
Regarding the legal basis for a more prominent proportionality lever, 
these authors point to the fact that proportionality is a fundamental legal 
principle in German law, based ultimately in the German constitution 
(Art. 19(4), 14(1)(2) FL, cf. also Sec. 242 GCC), and which is to be applied 
to all fields of the law.198 Furthermore, Art. 3(2) of the Enforcement 
Directive states that remedies for IP infringement shall be “effective, 
proportionate and dissuasive”, thereby explicitly introducing a 
proportionality requirement which must – in principle and subject to the 
Member States’ leeway in implementing EU Directives – be complied with 
by German patent law.199 In several communications, the EU Commission 
has stressed the importance of proportionality as one element in the 
Enforcement Directive’s triad of effectiveness, proportionality and 
dissuasiveness.200 While some contend that this legal context permits 
 
193 Cf. Osterrieth, supra note 179, at 985 et seq.; Ohly, supra note 75, at 791. 
194 Ohly, supra note 75, at 795 et seq.; Osterrieth, supra note 179, at 986 (pointing in particular 
to the complex, connected products which are brought about by the digital transformation); Marcus 
Sonnenberg, DIE EINSCHRÄNKBARKEIT DES PATENTRECHTLICHEN UNTERLASSUNGSANSPRUCHS IM 
EINZELFALL, 17 (Springer Gabler, 2014). 
195 Osterrieth, supra note 179, at 987, (referencing  BGH May 10, 2016, X ZR 114/13). 
196 Osterrieth, supra note 179, at 987. 
197 Osterrieth, supra note 47, at 542. 
198 Pitz, supra note 177, at 78; see also Osterrieth, supra note 180, at ¶ 984. 
199 See Pitz, supra note 29, at § 139 ¶ 78 (pointing out the potential need for Germany to revamp 
its patent law in order to comply with Sec. 3(2) Enforcement Directive). 
200 Guidance on certain aspects of Directive 2004/48/EC of the European Parliament and of the 
Council on the enforcement of intellectual property rights,  COM 708 (2017); Communication from the 
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reading a proportionality requirement into Sec. 139(1) GPA, others 
perceive such an operation to be incompatible with the wording of the 
provision and prefer the application of Sec. 242 GCC.201 For use-by periods 
at least, the German Federal Court of Justice seems equally to prefer an 
application of Sec. 242 GCC.202 
Assuming the introduction of a broader proportionality test, what 
would the consequences be if an (unfettered) injunction appeared 
disproportionate under the circumstances of the case? Among the 
suggestions are the grant of adjustment periods permitting a redesign of the 
infringing product203 or of use-by periods204 enabling the infringer to sell 
off its stock of infringing goods. Use-by periods are, in principle, already 
recognized by German courts as an attenuating measure if the immediate 
enforcement of an injunction would constitute a disproportionate hardship 
on the infringer.205 In practice, though, courts are reticent to grant such 
periods. In the high-profile “air scarf” case, for instance, the Federal Court 
of Justice prohibited the delivery of cars without granting a use-by period, 
even though only one technical detail of a built-in heating device was 
considered a patent infringement.206  
Some proposals go even farther, arguing – in appropriate cases – for 
the replacement of injunctions by monetary compensation as a more 
flexible and oftentimes sufficient remedy.207 Besides comparative 
references to judicial discretion in Anglo-American tort law,208 Art. 12 
Enforcement Directive serves as their main dogmatic fundament, since the 
provision states that “Member States may provide that, in appropriate cases 
and at the request of the person liable to be subject to the measures 
provided for in this section, the competent judicial authorities may order 
 
Commission to the European Parliament and the Council: Setting out the EU approach to Standard 
Essential Patents, COM 712 (2017). 
201 Alexander Reetz  et al., Die Befugnisse der nationalen Gerichte unter dem EPÜ und des 
Einheitlichen Patentgerichts (EPG) nach Art. INTVEPGUE Artikel 63 (1) EPGÜ zum Erlass von 
Unterlassungsverfügungen – eine rechtsvergleichende Untersuchung, 3 GRUR INT’L 210, 211 et seq. 
(2015). 
202  BGH May 10, 2016, X ZR 114/13 (referencing BGH 11.3.1982, I ZR 58/80). 
203 Ohly, supra note 75, at 797; Osterrieth, supra note 179, at 986. 
204 Cf. Osterrieth, supra note 179, at 988. 
205 Voß, supra note 8, at ¶ 198(a) (referencing: BGH May 10, 2016, X ZR 114/13 –; LG 
Düsseldorf Mar. 9, 2017, 4a O 137/15). 
206 BGH May 10, 2016, X ZR 114/13. 
207 Ohly, supra note 75, at 796; Osterrieth, supra note 179, at 994 et seq.; Pitz, supra note 29, 
¶ 76; Grabinski & Zülch, supra note 5, at ¶ 153(a). As to the calculation of damages replacing 
injunction, see Ohly, supra note 75, at  797 (favoring the general rules on calculating damages for 
patent infringement). 
208 Ohly, supra note 75, at 789. 
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pecuniary compensation to be paid to the injured party instead of applying 
the measures provided for in this section if that person acted 
unintentionally and without negligence, if execution of the measures in 
question would cause him/her disproportionate harm and if pecuniary 
compensation to the injured party appears reasonably satisfactory”. Some 
case-law dealing with preliminary injunctions or the provisional 
enforcement of first instance decisions contains language which may be 
taken to support greater flexibility in choosing between damages and 
injunctions as well. The Düsseldorf Regional Court, for instance, held that 
damages were more appropriate than a preliminary injunction in a case in 
which the patentee exploited its patent only by licensing, licensing 
negotiations had already been conducted between the parties, and some 
doubts existed regarding patent validity.209 As another example, the 
Karlsruhe Higher Regional Court took into account the specific, monetary 
compensation-oriented interests of a suing NPE when exercising its 
discretion regarding the provisional enforcement of a first instance 
decision.210 
In spite of growing support for a more important role of 
proportionality levers in German patent injunction law, the approach is far 
from being unanimously consented. Large-scale case-law that would limit 
injunctions by way of a proportionality lever is, as yet, missing. Critical 
scholars point to the expropriatory tendency of a broad proportionality 
requirement and the loss in effective infringement deterrence it brings 
about.211 They also underline that the German lawmaker has, so far, chosen 
not to translate Art. 3(2) and Art. 12 Enforcement Directive into explicit 
German provisions on limiting injunctions.212 
ii. Criteria 
When softening injunctions, very much depends, of course, on the 
criteria which trigger such modifications. As to use-by periods, the Federal 
Court of Justice’s “air scarf” decision has held that they can be considered, 
if the infringer would otherwise suffer disproportionate disadvantages and 
 
209 LG Düsseldorf July 8, 1999, 4 O 187/99. 
210 OLG Karlsruhe May 11, 2009, 6 U 38/09; OLG Karlsruhe Mar. 23, 2011, 6 U 66/09. 
211 This position is particularly strong in general literature on limiting injunctions, see REINHARD 
INGERL & CHRISTIAN ROHNKE, MARKENGESETZ: KOMMENTAR, §§ 14-19 ¶¶ 186, 192 (C.H. Beck 3d 
ed. 2010); Fritz Baur & Rolf Stürner, SACHENRECHT, § 12 ¶ 21 (C.H. Beck 17 ed. 1999); Name 
Gursky, Title, in STAUDINGER BGB, § 1004 ¶ 156 (2006); Name Schiemann, Title, in STAUDINGER 
BGB, § 251 ¶ 31 (2005). (These last two cites are very unclear and are not referenced below, it seems 
that it’s referring a section of the book but doesn’t list the title) 
212 Reetz et al., supra note 202, at 211 and its footnotes with further references. 
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the temporary continuation of the infringement would not result in 
unreasonable impairments for the injured party.213 As to damages in lieu of 
injunctions, Art. 12 Enforcement Directive considers – as cited above – the 
lack of intent and negligence, disproportionate harm that an injunction 
would inflict upon the infringer, as well as whether pecuniary 
compensation would be “reasonably satisfactory”. Recital (25) 
Enforcement Directive introduces additional considerations, stating that 
injunctions should not be replaced by pecuniary compensation “where the 
commercial use of counterfeit goods or the supply of services would 
constitute an infringement of law other than intellectual property law or 
would be likely to harm consumers”. Building on this statutory and case-
law, scholars are discussing a set of criteria for a case-sensitive balancing 
exercise, which can be summarized as follows:214  
● technical/innovative and economic significance of the patent;  
● strength of the patent, i.e. its likelihood to survive a challenge; 
● the possibility and consequences (delay, costs, etc.) of simply giving 
up, working around or substituting the protected technology (in 
particular for damages in lieu of injunction); 
● the nature and extent of the infringement as embodied by the 
infringing product, in particular whether the infringing product is 
mainly implementing the patented invention or whether the patent 
is covering only one feature of a complex product;  
● whether the patentee is practicing or merely (as an NPE) licensing 
the patent;  
● the nature and extent of the infringer’s fault, depending i.a. on 
whether a great density of pertinent IP rights complicated the 
identification of potentially infringed patents;  
● the availability of an adequate license; 
● unusually adverse economic consequences of the injunction, for 
instance threat of insolvency of the infringer; 
● public or third-party interests do, in principle, not matter; 
 
213 BGH May 10, 2016, X ZR 114/13 (referencing BGH Mar. 11, 1982, I ZR 58/80). 
214 Cf. BGH May 10, 2016, X ZR 114/13; OLG Karlsruhe May 11, 2009, 6 U 38/09; OLG 
Karlsruhe Mar. 23, 2011, 6 U 66/09; LG Düsseldorf July 08, 1999, 4 O 187/99; LG Düsseldorf Mar. 9, 
2017, 4a O 137/15; Ohly, supra note 75, at 797; Voß, supra note 8, at ¶ 198(a); Pitz, supra note 29,  ¶¶ 
76, 79; Grabinski & Zülch, supra note 5, at ¶ 153(a); Osterrieth, supra note 179, at 988, 991 et seq.; 
Henrik Holzapfel, Zum einstweiligen Rechtsschutz im Wettbewerbs- und Patentrecht, 4 GRUR 287, 292 
(2003). 
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● there seems to be broad consensus that a presumption weighs in 
favor of an unrestricted injunction and that the burden of proof lies 
with the infringer.215   
2. Injunctions in German SEP/FRAND cases216 
i. German case-law post-Huawei 
Under German law, just as under the law of other EU Member 
States,217 the grant of an injunction in SEP/FRAND cases depends not only 
on the rules particular to this set of cases (e.g. competition law rules as 
shaped by the Huawei v. ZTE decision) but also on whether the general 
requirements for injunctive relief are fulfilled, such as infringement of the 
patent and patent ownership of the claimant (cf. above chapter A.2.). As a 
result, the granting of injunctions in FRAND cases depends on two layers 
of requirements, first the general injunction requirements and, second, the 
parties’ compliance with the content and conduct component of the 
FRAND concept. Regarding the second layer of requirements, the Huawei 
v. ZTE-framework arguably orders, in principle, that parties carry out the 
steps of their staged negotiation before they go to court. This could expose 
the patentee to a permanent loss of its injunction claim, or the implementer 
to a final injunction, if the court found shortcomings in the respective 
party’s pre-litigation conduct. However, German courts attempt to soften 
things by way of two procedural mechanisms, namely the possibility to 
catch-up on pre-litigation obligations and the rejection of injunction claims 
as currently unfounded.  
The Düsseldorf Courts, for instance, held that parties can make up for 
a failure to offer FRAND licenses in due time by submitting such offers 
during trial, as long as the general procedural rules on delayed submissions 
permit and the parties have sufficient time before conclusion of the oral 
hearing to carry out the Huawei/ZTE steps.218 Catching-up is, thus, a fact-
sensitive approach. Importantly, where the patentee has, but the 
implementer has not, complied with its Huawei/ZTE conduct obligations in 
due course, it is not abusive for the patentee to bring injunction litigation, 
even though the implementer may be able to catch up during trial.219  
 
215 Ohly, supra note 75, at 797; Osterrieth, supra note 179, at 991. 
216 Picht, supra note 154. 
217 For a UK example, cf. Unwired Int’l  v. Huawei Tech. [2017] EWHC 711 (Pat) (Eng.). 
218 LG Düsseldorf Mar. 31, 2016, 4a O 73/14; LG Düsseldorf July 13, 2017, 4a O 16/16. 
219  LG Düsseldorf Mar. 31, 2016, 4a O 73/14. 
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If the patentee is in default regarding its Huawei v. ZTE-obligations 
and does not manage to catch up during litigation, German courts have 
rejected the claim for an injunction as currently – as opposed to: 
permanently – unfounded,220 comparing it to the claim for a payment which 
is not due yet.221 This enables the patentee to subsequently fulfill its 
obligations out-of-court and re-commence litigation afterwards.222  
Although not concerning the injunction claim itself but one instrument 
for enforcing that claim, it is interesting to notice that the Düsseldorf 
Regional Court has considered it an abuse of dominance for a SEP holder 
to apply for customs enforcement regarding products infringing the SEP 
where the implementer/infringer is, without reasonable doubt, entitled to a 
FRAND license-defense.223 
ii. The impact of the general patent law-discourse on more flexible 
injunctions 
This contribution has already addressed the discourse on increased 
flexibility for injunctions in general patent law (cf. above F.1.). To address 
the question whether this discourse may instruct the handling of FRAND 
injunctions as well, the following section discusses the relevance of criteria 
developed with regard to use-by periods in general patent law for the 
SEP/FRAND context.  
● To begin with procedural matters, since the FRAND requirement 
layer tends to raise the bar for getting an injunction, the infringer’s 
burden of proof and the assumption in favor of unrestricted 
injunctions should apply here a fortiori.  
● How the other criteria play out is not self-evident. As to the strength 
and significance of the infringed patent, relevance of a SEP is hard 
to deny since it must have been held valid, standard-essential and 
infringed before the question of a use-by period even arises. 
Certainly, some SEPs are more innovative than others. On the 
other hand, the joint decision to integrate the protected technology 
into the standard is an acknowledgement of its relevance by 
stakeholder experts. Follow-on development efforts by the 
 
220 OLG Düsseldorf Mar. 30, 2017, I-15 U 66/15; OLG Düsseldorf June 29, 2017, I-15 U 41/17 
(holding that the urgency necessary for a preliminary injunction will generally be missing if the 
injunction claim in the main proceedings is currently unfounded); LG Düsseldorf July 13, 2017, 4a O 
16/16. 
221 OLG Düsseldorf Mar. 30, 2017, I-15 U 66/15. 
222 LG Düsseldorf July 13, 2017, 4a O 16/16. 
223 LG Düsseldorf Nov. 9, 2017, 14d O 13/17. 
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implementer will not usually be very relevant to the facts that the 
SEP works in the context of the standard and performs, together 
with the other patents, the functions the standard was developed for 
because it is the very point of standard-setting that implementers 
can resort to a workable, interoperable set of technologies 
performing said functions. However, follow-on innovation that is 
based on the standard but does not directly impact it can matter 
depending on its extent. More importantly, giving much weight to 
SEP quality considerations risks to burden litigation with yet 
another difficult task. Even thorough top-down royalty calculation 
exercises so far have resorted to patent counting instead of quality 
determination,224 and this shows how hard quality-based 
approaches are in this field. In sum, patent relevance should 
probably, in most circumstances, not point towards the grant of 
use-by periods.  
● As to the nature, in particular the complexity, of the infringing 
product, one can argue that the implementation of the standard 
adds, as such, a certain degree of complexity to each standard-
based product. However, standard-based products can still be of 
vastly differing levels of complexity.225 This necessitates a case-by-
case assessment of this aspect. The overall number of patents 
relating to the product can be quite high as at least the technologies 
integrated into prominent mobile communication standards are 
subject to intense patenting activity.226 At the same time, it seems 
easier to respect or license a cluster of patents if and because their 
potential relevance follows from a database of declared SEPs than 
to respect the same number of patents if they are not pre-declared 
in such a way. If the infringed patent forms part of a set of publicly 
declared SEPs, the fact that this set is large should be of a more 
limited weight than regarding patents not so declared.  
● As to the business model of the patentee, the fact that the 
SEP/FRAND system is all about licensing patents reduces the 
weight of the practicing/non-practicing patentee criterion. At the 
same time, where the SEP owner practices its patent, material harm 
inflicted upon this business activity by the infringer’s ongoing 
 
224 Cf. TCL Commc’n Tech. Holdings, Ltd v. Telefonaktiebolaget LM Ericsson, No.CV 15-2370 
JVS (DFMx), 2017 WL 6611635, at *15 (C.D. Cal Dec. 21, 2017). 
225 For instance, a relatively simple chipset and (in the future) a 5G-enabled drone could both be 
considered standard-implementing products. 
226 Case C-170/13, Huawei Tech. v. ZTE Corp., 2015 EUR-Lex, 62013CJ0170. 
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distribution during a use-by period cuts against the grant of such a 
period.  
● The assessment of the level of fault displayed by the implementer is 
partly linked to the conduct requirements established in the CJEU’s 
Huawei/ZTE decision. Given that German patent law is quite strict 
on the required level of care, an infringing implementer will not 
usually be able to claim continued unawareness of the patent if the 
patent is registered in a SEP database and the patentee has, as 
required by Huawei/ZTE, given notice of the specific 
infringement.227 Not accepting the patentee’s license offer right 
away but submitting – as envisaged by the Huawei/ZTE decision228 
– a counter-offer should not normally increase the implementer’s 
fault, at least if the implementer can be, in good faith, of the 
opinion that the counter-offer is FRAND. The opposite is true, 
however, where the court has found that the implementer engaged 
in delaying tactics.  
● As to the economic consequences of an injunction, a balancing of 
economic hardship could be done by comparing the adverse 
monetary effects for the infringer with the hypothetical FRAND 
royalties the patentee could have collected.229 The economic 
consequences of being enjoined from using a standard-essential 
patent will often be severe, if and because the implementer must 
stop using the standard altogether. According to market reports, 
though, work-arounds appear sometimes possible without losing at 
least factual compatibility with the standard.  
Overall, these reflections show that further research and discussion is 
warranted to build a coherent framework for general patent constellations 
and SEP/FRAND situations. However, legal coherence is not the same as 
homogeneity of rules and not the same as one size fits all. One aspect that 
fundamentally distinguishes FRAND from other constellations is the 
availability of a license legalizing use of the patent for the future. There 
may be exceptional circumstances in which a smooth conclusion of the 
license agreement appears so doubtful and the license’s FRANDliness so 
questionable as to hamper this resort. For the bulk of SEP/FRAND cases, 
though, the likelihood of a use-by period may prove lower than in cases 
outside this context. 
 
227 Case C-170/13, Huawei Tech. v. ZTE Corp., 2015 EUR-Lex, 62013CJ0170. 
228 Id. at ¶ 66. 
229 This parallels the approach in general patent law, see Ohly, supra note 75, at 8 et seq. 
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G. CONCLUSION AND OUTLOOK  
German patent injunction law is complex but also highly operational. 
Stakeholders should keep a watch on whether recent dynamics from within 
the system promise to change the established equilibrium for the better or 
whether they need to be adjusted. Change may, however, come from the 
EU level as well: At present, the European Unitary Patent System (UPS)230 
is still in limbo, with a pending decision of the German Constitutional 
Court and Brexit being the main roadblocks.231 Nonetheless, it seems more 
likely than not that it will, eventually, see the light of day. Unitary 
European Patents will then also be protected from infringement by an 
injunction claim according to Art. 63 UPCA. However, the UPS injunction 
has a built-in discretionary element as Art. 63(1) UPC Astates that courts 
“may grant an injunction” in the event of infringement. The Uniform Patent 
Courts are competent to decide on injunctions relating to Uniform Patents, 
although the UPS provisions do not spell this out very clearly.232 It remains 
to be seen how the judges of these courts will shape, against the 
background of the various legal traditions they come from, the UPS 
injunction rules. Depending also on the opt-in/opt-out-strategy chosen by 
patent holders,233 Member State law injunctions are likely to remain 
important for quite some time to come. Nonetheless, if and when the UPS 
enters into force, it will impact the German rules which formed the subject 
of this contribution and it will turn a page in the story of European patent 
law as a whole.  
 
230 The system rests on UPC and the UPCA. 
231 Cf. Alan Johnson, The Unified Patent Court: all dressed up but no place to go?, KLUWER 
PATENT BLOG (January 18, 2019), http://patentblog.kluweriplaw.com/2019/01/18/the-unified-patent-
court-all-dressed-up-but-no-place-to-go/. 
232 Cf. Benjamin Schröer, Einheitspatentgericht – Überlegungen zum Forum-Shopping im 
Rahmen der alternativen Zuständigkeit nach Art. INTVEPGUE Artikel 83 Abs. INTVEPGUE Artikel 
83 Absatz 1 EPGÜ, 12 GRUR INT’L 1102, 1104(2013) (viewing Art. 32(1)(a) UPCA). 
233 Opt-in according to Art. 3(1), 18(6), 9(1)g UPC, Art 83(4) UPCA, opt-out according to Art. 
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out. 
